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ABSTRACT

ALL-LANDS MANAGEMENT: CONVENING COMMUNITIES AND THEIR
LANDS AROUND FIRE MANAGEMENT
Jodie Pixley

Broadly defined, All-lands Management (ALM) is a land management approach
involving collaborative, science-based ecosystem restoration at the landscape scale,
across ownership and jurisdictional boundaries. My research investigates collaborative
groups working to reduce wildfire risk by applying ALM. Fire risk in the Pacific West
(California and Oregon) is increasing in severity and extent due to fire suppression and is
exacerbated by the effects of drought, climate change, and expanding residential
development. For decades federal, state, and local entities have expressed the need to
work collaboratively, across boundaries and ownerships to reintroduce fire back onto the
landscape to restore forest resiliency. This research reveals barriers that prevent broader
ALM utilization, framing the implementation difficulties as bureaucratic rigidity
problems. Ultimately, the goal of my research is to reveal the capacities of the cases this
study is based that enable ALM.
I conducted in-depth interviews, participant observation, and document analysis
with two case studies: the Western Klamath Restoration Partnership (WKRP) and the
Ashland Forest Resiliency Stewardship Project (AFR). The cases demonstrate how ALM
is being implemented in different contexts, as well as existing social, economic, and
political barriers to its effective implementation. Both cases have employed principles of
ii

the 2010 National Cohesive Wildland Fire Management Strategy – by following these
principles both groups aim to shift out of a full suppression model of fire management
into a more resilience based model. Both have faced a plethora of challenges, but have
problem-solved differently. I explore the ways the two cases developed strategies to
enhance their capacities for ALM.
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

Fire exclusion in mixed conifer, fire-adapted forests of the Pacific West has
increased fuel accumulations and wildland fire severity (North et al. 2012). From 2000 to
2015, national fire statistics show a dramatic spike in wildfire acres burned and
management costs (NIFC 2015). Forest policy is adjusting to address these problems by
shifting from a model of fire suppression that sought to eliminate wildfire to an approach
that recognizes wildfire as a natural process and seeks to manage forests for resilience to
wildfire. Forests resilient to wildland fire are adapted to perturbation through wildfire and
retain their fundamental structure and function (Cumming et al. 2013). A resilience-based
approach to management of forest wildfires (hereafter, “resilience model”) attempts to
redefine our relationship to wildfire from one of exclusion to one of living with fire and
reducing its negative socioeconomic and ecological impacts (USDA 2015).
To achieve a forest resilience model, Tom Vilsack, the Secretary of Agriculture,
in 2009 called for a “complete commitment to restoration” by utilizing an “all-lands
approach to forest management” (USDA-USFS 2012, p.1). The National Cohesive
Wildland Fire Management Strategy (Cohesive Strategy) of 2010, a collaborative effort
of local to national professionals, calls for a forest resilience model involving an “alllands, all hands” approach (USDA and USDOI 2009, p.1). This requires coordination
among different landowner types and jurisdictions (all-hands) to achieve landscape-scale
(all-lands) projects – an effective scale which remedies severe fire impacts (Quigley et al.
1996).
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In this research, I focus on two groups striving to implement an all-lands
approach, termed here “All-lands Management (ALM).” I equally stress the “all-hands,”
or multi-owner and collaborative group planning aspect, because all-lands projects
require that all jurisdictions work together. ALM is a land management approach
involving collaborative, science-based ecosystem restoration at the landscape scale,
across ownership and jurisdictional boundaries. Projects employing both “all-hands” and
“all-lands” in ALM are the focus of this research to help better understand what is
required in a shift to a resilience model.
I illustrate ALM – how groups are organizing for it, how it is implemented on the
ground, and the policies and programs that support it –through two case studies, the
Ashland Forest Resiliency Stewardship Project (AFR) group of Ashland, OR, and the
Western Klamath Restoration Partnership (WKRP) group of Orleans, CA. Both are
located in the Klamath-Siskiyou Mountains Ecoregion (Figures 1,2), a region with an
exceptionally high rate of biodiversity, maintained in part through frequent fire (Agee
1993; Skinner et al. 2006; ODFW 2006; Briles et al. 2005). These groups both include
collaboratives of diverse stakeholders and a mix of land ownership types. However, their
strategies for implementing ALM, and the contexts in which they are doing so, differ
substantially.
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Figure 1. Geographic locations of ALM cases

Figure 2. Klamath-Siskiyou region extent
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The stakeholders and policies supporting a forest resilience model are multi-scalar
– they operate at local, regional, and national levels. At a national level, policies and
programs have been developed to deal with fire threats that allow for federal agencies to
work with local groups and to create a framework for the implementation of ALM. At a
local level, collaborative capacity is being built to engage with these policies and
programs through partnerships composed of Forest Service agency personnel, state and
local government actors, tribal members and employees, local and national nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), scientific experts, environmental organizations, and
private landowners.
Diverse ALM collaborative groups involving multi-scalar organizations (local to
national players) seek to engage all landowners to facilitate the shift to a resilience
model. This is a type of problem-solving, which Ostrom (1998) termed “polycentric”
governance, is characterized by nested, semi-autonomous decision-making units
operating at multiple scales. Polycentric structures “can address environmental problems
at multiple scales more readily than centralized governance structures” since they
encourage different responses to complex problems and can encourage innovation by
gathering together diverse individuals and organizations (Cumming et al. 2013, p.1144).
I hypothesize that for large-scale, cross-boundary coordination to endure there
must be institutions, programs, and policies supporting it. Successful cross-boundary
coordination involving these institutions, programs, and policies are collaborative,
representative of all partners, and provide funding to all players. Institutions in the
context of ALM refer to the collaborative groups active in forest management and the
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rules they follow, that are represented in collaborative groups. Throughout this thesis, I
refer to the collection of organizations that make up each collaborative as an ALM group.
The research question guiding this thesis is: How is ALM implemented in fireadapted landscapes? I provide answers to this question through three objectives: 1) to
describe ALM through two cases – how they organize, and engage with policies and
programs; 2) to discuss the legal, regulatory, and economic contexts that facilitate and
constrain ALM; and 3) to analyze how collaboratives capitalize on opportunities and
overcome constraints to implement ALM. I depict ALM as a potential tool in the shift
from fire suppression to a resilience model of forest management.
In this research, I characterize ALM as a type of Community-Based Natural
Resource Management (CBNRM) because of the federal Cohesive Strategy’s call to local
stakeholders (organizations and residents) to co-lead ALM; as well as for the critical role
local players had in this study. CBNRM may include many actors in addition to local
players, for example: state, national, and non-governmental entities (Agrawal and Gibson
1999; Kellert et al. 2000). Because of this I situate this research in the CBNRM body of
literature.
I contribute to CBNRM by discussing the implementation of ALM, a new
management approach involving coordination of all landowners on mixed ownership
landscapes, to work collectively to shift out of full suppression management. CBNRM
does not distinctly take place on mixed ownership landscapes whereas ALM does (Cox et
al. 2010; Gruber 2010; Blaikie 2006; Armitage 2005). Kellert et al. (2000) explained that
CBNRM initially gained attention in the early 1970s to resolve conflicts between state
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and local actors. Some conflicts involved centrally controlled conservation projects
jeopardizing the long-term sustainability of sensitive areas. Similarly, ALM addresses
vulnerability of sensitive areas. However, ALM contrasts with CBNRM in formalizing
the decentralized management approach that brings all stakeholders together. Also, very
few studies have examined collaborative and cooperative wildland fire management another contribution of this research (McCaffrey et al. 2015).
This research reveals how policies and programs provide a framework for ALM
as they are utilized by ALM groups in two case studies. In Chapter 2, I situate this
research in the literature and provide context for changing fire policies. I discuss the
ecological and budgetary crises of contemporary fire management facing policy and
decision makers. In Chapter 3, I detail the research methods employed. Chapter 4
explains how two ALM cases utilize programs and policies differently. Lastly, Chapter 5
highlights the differing capacities and challenges of ALM groups in each case working to
shift out of full suppression management.
There were several major themes revealed by the ALM case studies in this
research. First, the ability of local-level organizations to partner with regional and
national groups builds capacity for ALM. Second, stakeholders on all levels must share in
decision-making. Last, ALM groups must be formally organized in order to jointly plan
and coordinate among landowners in a given project.
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CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The Changing Policies of Fire Management
In this section I provide fire policy and forest management context for federal
lands of the United States and why managers are trying to shift out of pure fire
suppression. Fire management approaches can be roughly divided into two camps: the
suppression model, and the resilience model – which only partly consists of suppression.
The dominant model, fire suppression, largely preceded the landmark 1995 Federal
Wildland Fire Management Policy. This 1995 policy was the first national policy to
acknowledge the need to shift away from full suppression and included the involvement
of private landowners to achieve it.
The 1995 policy called for “landscape-level resource management and
implementation … and the involvement of all affected landowners and stakeholders”
(NIFC 2001, p.1). Subsequently, in 2000 the Secretaries of the Departments of
Agriculture and Interior were tasked with producing a report recommending how to:
address severe, ongoing fire activity; reduce impacts of fire to rural communities and the
environment; and ensure sufficient firefighting resources in the future. The report became
the cornerstone of the National Fire Plan (NFP), and a major feature was interagency
collaboration and coordination involving both federal and non-federal entities “to further
develop a coordinated strategy addressing the threats posed by wildland fire” (DOI &
USDA 2007, p.1).
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The main tenets of the NFP were “a commitment to help protect communities,
natural resources, and most importantly, the lives of firefighters and the public. This
commitment is [still] shared among federal agencies, states, local governments, tribes,
and other partners” (DOI & USDA 2007, p.1). The NFP signaled agency commitment to
a forest resilience model and a shift away from full fire suppression; it has since been
updated and was the precursor to the 2010 Cohesive Strategy. However, there remain
significant challenges in making this shift (Stephens and Ruth 2005; North et al. 2012).
As part of the shift toward a resilience model, recent fire management policies
and programs have encouraged landowners and managers to work across ownership
boundaries to implement ALM. Some of these programs include the Collaborative Forest
Landscape Restoration Program, Two Chiefs Joint Restoration Partnership, Firewise, and
the Fire Learning Network. These programs have created capacities for managers to
creatively adapt to threats and opportunities that current wildfire trends impose (Oregon
2015; Harling and Tripp 2014; Butler and Goldstein 2010; Cumming et al. 2013).
The dominant model: suppression
Though Native American people in the American West used fire as a primary
management tool for 11,000 years, it was replaced by the suppression model (Sugihara
and Barbour 2006). Suppression shaped forest-fire management starting in the 1880s in
the United States during the European settlement era (Sugihara and Barbour 2006). In the
1890s fire was claimed to be “the enemy of the American forests” and this perspective
began to dominate policy (Kosek 2006, p. 203). After five million acres burned in the
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West in 1910, killing more than eighty people, suppression mandates intensified (Kosek
2006; Sugihara and Barbour 2006).
A U.S. Forest Service (USFS) study in the 1920s framed Native American
burning as harmful to the primary value of national forests, which was timber production
(Show and Kotok 1924). This and similar studies resulted in the Clarke-McNary Act of
1924, which effectively created a nationwide public land fire suppression policy
(Stephens and Ruth 2005). Further reinforcement of suppression occurred in the 1940s
when the Wartime Advertising Council launched the iconic Smokey the Bear campaign
(Kosek 2006).
Fire suppression would dominate funding and management priorities for decades,
though there was a slowly growing counter view that the cumulative impacts of fire
suppression were linked to overall ecosystem decline in fire-adapted forests (Agee 1993).
Over a century of fire suppression, logging, and road construction in western fire-adapted
forests resulted in increased stand density, decreased overall tree size, and increased fuel
loads - increasing vulnerability of forests to uncharacteristically high disturbance levels
particularly from fire, insects, and disease (Stephens et al. 2009; Collins et al. 2011; Allen
et al. 2005; Churchill et al. 2012). This resulted in high suppression costs and negative
impacts to communities and forests (Everett and Fuller 2011; Stephens and Ruth 2005;
Hessburg et al. 2005).
The turn toward the resilience model
A resilience model approach to forest and fire management has emerged. Authors
Walker and Salt (2006) discuss the roots of resilience, and explain that it is “an entirely
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new way of thinking about the management of our environment” (p. iv). They cite the
growing dissatisfaction, worldwide, with the ways in which natural resources are
managed where vulnerabilities to ecosystems and human communities have resulted (e.g.
loss of wetlands, increasing floods, worsening water quality and fire events, resource
depletion, etc.). Commonly termed, “Resilience thinking”, this model contrasts to the
dominant management paradigm of command and control in which ecological systems
are manipulated primarily for human use and benefit. Instead, resilience thinking
acknowledges the dynamic and changing nature of ecosystems, and systems (social,
ecological) in general, and proposes adaptive practices that work with systems rather than
against them.
In the context of forest and fire management, a resilience model asserts that
management which includes fire, like mechanical fuel reduction and prescribed-fire
treatments applied together, as well as managed wildfire, can help re-establish forest
health (Stephens et al. 2009; Churchill et al. 2012; Quigley et al. 1996). Studies define
resilient forests as resembling reference stands, which retain pre-settlement era
conditions. These conditions are characterized by uneven-aged forests of varying
densities mixed with clearings and meadows that persisted for centuries due to frequent
fire. These patterns can provide resiliency, as the forests historically burned at low or
mixed severity, reducing fuel accumulations and ladder fuels and discouraging crown
fires (Skinner et al. 2006; Taylor and Skinner 2003; Agee 1993). Shifting to a resilience
model requires dramatic changes not only in stand treatments, but also environmental
governance by calling upon all managers and landowners to coordinate strategies.
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In 2002, President Bush announced his Healthy Forests Initiative to implement
core components of the NFP to reduce adverse human and environmental impacts of
wildland fire. These efforts led to the 2003 Healthy Forests Restoration Act (HFRA),
which in part worked to streamline the lengthy National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) review processes. It also mandated agencies to include the public in fuels
reduction projects by holding public meetings during their preparation (USFS-DOI
2004). Additionally, the use of community wildfire protection plans (CWPPs) was
mandated in the HFRA, though the idea of CWPPs was first proposed and implemented
by communities active in fire management to better provide safety and protection to area
residents (Shaffer et al. 2002; Abrams et al. 2015). CWPPs “provide a seamless guide for
fuel reduction across ownerships, identifying those treatments to be completed by public
agencies and those to be completed by private landowners” (USFS and USDOI 2004,
p.1). CWPPs are an important tool for local stakeholder involvement and for groups
engaging with ALM (McCaffrey et al. 2015).
Since the creation of these policies in the early 2000s scholars have reviewed
whether they accomplish the goal of creating a more efficient and effective fire
management program. Conclusions are mixed. Progress toward policy goals has been
slower than anticipated while fire suppression and fuel reduction projects have been
prioritized over restoration and community assistance – which more often engage local
stakeholders (McCaffrey et al. 2015; Stephens and Ruth 2005). Private landowners have
reported difficulties in partnering with federal entities because of lengthy planning
processes (e.g. NEPA) when they prefer to take more timely actions toward risk
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reduction (Bergmann and Bliss 2004). Meanwhile CWPPs have been effective in
engaging partners (McCaffrey et al. 2013).
Stephens and Ruth (2005) discuss that despite the multiple legislative and
administrative efforts in support of fuel reduction and restoration, there is a need for
comprehensive policy. They call for policy to define key decisions in setting priorities,
and that this should be made collaboratively at local levels. An outcome of the NFP was
the formation of the Wildland Fire Leadership Council (WFLC). The Council is an
intergovernmental committee dedicated to the implementation of wildland fire policy and
goals, and is comprised of federal, state, tribal, county, and municipal government
officials (DOI & USDA 2007). WFLC was at the helm of the 2010 Cohesive Strategy
which aims to develop a collaborative structure for coordinated fire management that is
inclusive of state and local governments as full partners in planning and decision making
(DOI & USDA 2010). This partly answers the call by Stephens and Ruth for a
comprehensive and inclusive fire management policy.
Implementing resilience through collaboration
The Cohesive Strategy policy encourages all-hands, all-lands fire management by
strategically pushing diverse stakeholders on all levels to work collaboratively across all
landscapes to make progress toward three goals. The three goals are: “1) resilient
landscapes, 2) fire adapted communities, and 3) safe and effective wildfire response”
(USDA and USDOI 2009, p.1). Rather than purely suppress fire, the Cohesive Strategy
emphasizes “liv[ing] with wildland fire” (USDA and USDOI 2009, p. 1). National
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programs have been developed to align with principles of the Cohesive Strategy and
gather diverse stakeholders to make the shift to a new model of forest management.
Federal agencies and legislators developed funding mechanisms to enable
Cohesive Strategy implementation, including the Collaborative Forest Landscape
Restoration Program (CFLRP) of 2009 and the Joint Chiefs Landscape Restoration
Partnership of 2014 (Joint Chiefs). CFLRP is administered by the U.S. Forest Service
(USFS) while Joint Chiefs is administered by both the USFS and the Natural Resources
Conservation Service (NRCS). The two cases in this research have engaged with the Joint
Chiefs program, which funds fire restoration work on public and private lands in mixedownership landscapes. Joint Chiefs works to “improve the health of forests where public
and private lands meet” (USDA and NRCS 2016, p.1).
The rigidity trap: despite resilience policies, suppression persists
In 2007 after five years of NFP implementation, a report from the Departments of
Interior and Agriculture claimed significant progress was made by fire management
agencies in creating effective fire protection while also adhering to commitments of
collaboration with diverse stakeholders. However, the report showed that fire suppression
continued to dominate management practices with 70% of treated lands receiving
suppression while only 30% received restoration including fuel reduction (DOI & USDA
2007). Suppression management is deeply rooted in national forest management due to
its 100-year (+) practice, and this protocol is similarly entrenched in public fire service
agencies tasked with wildfire response.
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The old suppression model is a form of crisis management, or emergency
response-based model. Butler and Goldstein (2010) argue that bureaucratic institutions
like the USFS are “caught in the rigidity trap” regarding crises such as wildfires (p.2).
The authors argue that fire suppression is reinforced by agencies through “incentive
structures, agency budgets, and professional practice” and as a result is resistant to
novelty and innovation (p. 1). In addition, wildland fire management has pushed the
USFS into a budget and management crisis due to the rising costs of fire suppression
(USDA 2015). Crises can also reinforce financial and/or political support for the status
quo as people implement what has worked previously and what they are already trained
to do (Yaffee 1996; North et al. 2012; McCaffrey et al. 2015; Stephens and Ruth 2005).
According to the U.S. Dept. of Agriculture (USDA), the USFS now dedicates
52% of its total annual budget to managing fire, this is up from 16% in 1995, and is
projected to increase to 65% by 2025 (USDA - USFS 2015). A 2015 report on the rising
cost of wildfire states the USFS agency is “at a tipping point”, the trend of increasing
costs “presents a significant threat to the viability of all other services that support our
national forests” (USDA-USFS 2015, p. 3). Large management challenges face national
forests like climate change, pushing the USFS towards this tipping point. Longer fire
seasons by 78(+) days compared to 1970(s) fire seasons, as well as the increasing
numbers of people moving into wildfire prone areas are both compounding challenges
and driving up the cost of fire management (USDA - USFS 2015). Rising suppression
costs due to longer fire seasons, degraded forest conditions, and fire protection services
all complicate funding for restoration particularly through a process called “fire transfers”
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(USDA - USFS 2015, p.3). Fire transfers are problematic as they redirect USFS monies
away from programs like restoration and others to firefighting.
Bureaucratic rigidity impacts shifting to a resilience model in both planning and
implementation. Cumming et al. (2013) evaluated landscape ecological studies with the
aim of enhancing landscape resilience and found that flexibility of institutions in planning
and implementation is of central importance. However, researchers have found that
federal land management agencies often operate under rigid bureaucratic structures
lacking specialized personnel to conduct prescribed fire and other activities, and put fire
managers at risk of personal liability if, for example, a prescribed fire escapes
(McCaffrey et al. 2015; North et al. 2012).
Policy-related factors reinforcing rigidity include complex planning requirements
such as NEPA, and agency protocol that incentivizes personnel to leave one national
forest for another in order to receive promotions (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000; Stephens
and Ruth 2005). Agency members that leave, instead of staying and investing in a longterm collaborative process such as ALM, may strain and disrupt the shift to a resilience
model. Time and personnel investment builds trust among members of a group (Cortner
and Moote 1999; McDermott et al. 1999). Researchers find building relationships and
trust requires long-term dedication and time investment, and will not work with frequent
changes in staffing (Davis and Moseley 2012).
On the other hand, NEPA introduces different rigidity challenges. The policy
mandates a lengthy environmental review process of federal entities to look carefully at
environmental conditions of a project area, and the potential impacts of intended actions.
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Professionals have referred to NEPA as a “necessary evil”, which requires lengthy
timelines and extensive planning (USFS agency member, interview 16). When groups
involve private landowners that make up part of the mixed-ownership landscape, NEPA
can present conflicting timeline priorities since non-federal jurisdictions are not required
to follow NEPA. They do follow other state and local guidelines which do not have the
complexity of NEPA.
Researchers have analyzed “the crux of the problem” in creating resilient
landscapes and found that developing fire management, multi-scalar institutions
(governmental and non-governmental groups across all scales) that act flexibly and
proactively, and that can learn and adapt with discovery of new information to be critical
(Butler and Goldstein 2010; Yaffee 1996; North et al. 2012; Cumming et al. 2013). This
opposes traditional planning and management methods led by agencies that are
centralized and operate from the top-down, rather than collaborative partnerships, which
are expansive, inclusive of diverse viewpoints, and more flexible. Yaffee (1996)
characterized collaborative decision-making as developing “problem solving approaches
that are interagency, multiparty, and interdisciplinary” (p.725).
Collaboratives: Learning from Success in Local Places
Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) is a collaborative, comanagement form of governance that forms around unique geographic and cultural
places and comprises “local, place-based projects, programs, and policies that have the
goal of advancing healthy environments and human communities” (Lurie and Hibbard
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2008, p. 430). Under CBNRM, centralized governmental authority is devolved to more
local levels and NGOs (Brosius et al. 1998). CBNRM contrasts with the historically
dominant American environmental management paradigm, which has followed a
centralized, top-down method to environmental problem solving (Kusel and Baker 2003).
Instead, CBNRM takes a bottom-up, locally-based approach shown to be more successful
as projects incorporate time- and place-specific knowledge of residents and local
organizations (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Kellert et al. 2000; Blaikie 2006).
Lurie and Hibbard (2008) find local, place-based projects reveal on-the-ground
resource management problems of a place and act as a central, organizing principle.
CBNRM projects can focus land managers and promote solutions that may be more
broadly applied, overcoming barriers. ALM groups have built upon the lessons of
CBNRM by encompassing cross-boundary, landscape level, forest resilience planning
and implementation. Additionally, CBNRM is commonly discussed as taking place in the
broader context with regional and national partners, but ALM formalizes this multi-scalar
partnership structure (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Gruber 2010; Armitage 2005). ALM
formalizes a multi-scalar partnership structure because if its multi-jurisdictional nature
and its goal to engage local stakeholders in national programs with federal and national
partners.
CBNRM is the notion that “communities should, and could, satisfactorily manage
their own resources according to their local custom, knowledge and technologies”
(Blaikie 2006). In a study comprising twenty-four cases of CBNRM, Gruber (2010) noted
that the model “support[ed] long-term management through broad participation of
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community members and resource users in decision making” – a concern of fire
managers who understand that ALM and restoring forest resiliency requires long-term
considerations (p.53). Armitage (2005) adds that CBNRM may incorporate local
institutions, cultural practices, and knowledge systems into management and regulatory
decision-making processes. In addition to incorporating local managers and their
institutions, integrating local knowledge about natural systems can benefit partnerships
and aid in problem solving. This asset can be understood through cultural capital – which
refers to the ways human societies have dealt with, adapted to, and modified their natural
environment over time (Berkes and Folke 1992).
Key insights CBNRM offers to ALM
CBNRM has continually evolved as communities learn lessons from each other
about: efficient and fair resource use; the integration of different types of knowledge;
and, the effective participation of diverse stakeholders in land management processes
(Blaikie 2006). Successful CBNRM projects that provide lessons to ALM groups, have
tended to have: 1) social, cultural, human, and financial capital; 2) shared decisionmaking among partners with a particular focus on local groups engaged in this process;
and 3) information sharing among stakeholders (Blaikie 2006; Agrawal and Gibson 1999;
Cox et al. 2010; Gruber 2010; Armitage 2005; Lurie and Hibbard 2008; Kellert et al.
2000).
The community capitals framework (Flora and Flora 2008) analyzes how
resources held within a community may be invested to create new resources. Flora and
Flora (2008) identified seven types of capital – natural, cultural, human, social, political,
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financial and built, each of which has implications for ALM. Lurie and Hibbard (2008)
found that as the geographic scale of projects and plans increase (i.e. landscape scale), so
too does the need for networking capacity or social capital, which helps to address
barriers such as limited financial resources, time, and staff. Social capital describes the
expectations of reciprocity and networks of support that develop among members of a
group, or between groups, that help to build capacity (Putnam 1995, Woolcock 1998).
Social capital in resource management contributes to alleviating distrust, encouraging
broader public participation, and increasing ability to obtain grants (Lurie and Hibbard
2008; Wagner and Fernandez-Gimenez 2008).
Human, cultural, and financial capital along with social capital, all help explain
how resources, knowledge, and skill contribute to progress a group engaged in locally
based, bottom-up resource management (Flora and Flora 2008). McDermott (1999) found
that collaboration and building social networks across management scales (local to
national) facilitates information sharing, identification of knowledge gaps and learning,
mobilization of political support, and recruitment of human capital in the form of
professional expertise. Human capital – the skills and expertise individuals bring to a
partnership enhance capacities of a group (e.g. facilitation, technical knowledge (Berkes
and Folke 1992; Becker 1994; Gruber 2010).
Cultural capital is understood as local knowledge about natural systems developed
from the ways human societies have dealt with, adapted to, and modified their natural
environment over time (Berkes and Folke 1992). As Flora and Flora define it, “cultural
capital can be thought of as the filter through which people live their lives, the daily or
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seasonal rituals they observe and the way they regard the world around them” (2008, p.
18).
Last, financial capital refers to having the financial means or having access to the
financial means to plan and implement projects, a key factor in expensive restoration
projects.
CBNRM groups in the Pacific West
CBNRM in the Pacific West arose during the timber wars in the early 1990s as a
response to conflict between the timber industry and environmentalists (KenCairn 1995;
Moseley 2000). Situated within forest-dependent communities, stakeholders sought to
resolve conflicts that addressed both industry and environmental issues, and to resolve
mistrust between local communities and federal land management agencies (Snow 2001;
Weber 2000; Gruber 2010). The Applegate Partnership and the Watershed Research and
Training Center were early examples of CBNRM in the Klamath-Siskiyou region
(KenCairn 1995; Weber 2000; Middleton and Baker 2002).
The Applegate Partnership has created (with their social network of partners)
innovative approaches to forest management practices involving prescribed burning, low
impact timber harvesting, and selective cutting (Stankey et al. 2006). The Watershed
Research and Training Center (with their social network of partners) has developed and
applied similar forest practices but additionally worked to develop a restoration-based
workforce along with economic markets based on restoration by-products (Stankey et al.
2006; Magyar 2013). Both groups have fostered an environment of collaboration, and
networks of stakeholders (on local to national levels) to deal with fire management

21
conflicts (KenCairn 1995; Koontz et al. 2004; Moseley 2000; Middleton and Baker
2002).
In the early 1990s both the Applegate Partnership and Watershed Research and
Training Center (WRTC) worked to overcome challenges of: disagreements on forest
practices, collaboration despite differing opinions, a downsizing timber industry, and
forest worker unemployment. They did this by spearheading collaborative partnerships
with federal agencies and the forest industry, building understandings of the USFS
agency bureaucracy to enhance local capacities to partner on this level, employing local
skills and expertise of key players to co-lead projects and reach agreements, and
garnering public support for their objectives (Jakes et al. 2007; USDA and USFS 2002).
The Applegate Partnership and WRTC organizations laid the foundation for and built-up
social capital that the ALM groups in this study have benefited from.
Challenges of Collaborations
This section highlights common challenges of CBNRM and cross-boundary
cooperation and their relevance to ALM. Lurie and Hibbard (2008) explained that
proponents of CBNRM have worked to advance both the ecological and socioeconomic
objectives of forest communities, but Kellert et al. (2000) found that “achieving the goals
of CBNRM has been complicated and organizationally challenging” (p.707). A main
tenet of CBNRM is decentralization of decision making to shared decision-making
among diverse partners, including local stakeholders, however this has proved
particularly challenging (Blaikie 2006).
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Agrawal and Gibson (1999) found there must be a focus on the multiple interests
and actors within communities that constitute a diverse partnership, and that these must
be incorporated to achieve shared decision-making. Increasingly, NGOs (e.g. The Nature
Conservancy), have partnered to broaden the capacities of local groups - facilitating
collaboration and coordination of projects inclusive of these partners’ aims (Kittredge
2005; Fernandez-Gimenez et al. 2004; Snow 2001; Brosius et al. 1998).
Kittredge (2005) found that few collaboratives develop in the absence of federal
agencies and their programs, and at the same time, their participation brings bureaucratic
challenges, including long planning timelines, inflexibility, a culture focused on risk
aversion rather than project priorities, and a lack of incentives for innovation (see also
McDermott et al. 1999). Agency culture also brings high employee turnover requiring
regular training of new personnel on existing projects, frustrating collaborators and
straining relationships; inconsistent budget allocations; and complex management plan
requirements (Fernandez-Gimenez et al. 2004). Another significant challenge for
stakeholders may be to overcome mistrust and suspicion of government partners due to
negative, past experiences (Bergmann and Bliss 2004).
Lastly, Bergmann and Bliss (2004) state that real and perceived power inequities
can impact collaborative fire management among different land ownerships. They argue
that collaboration relies on trusting relationships where decision-making processes are
equally shared between private and public landowners, but note how rare this is,
particularly at ecologically meaningful scales.
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CHAPTER III. RESEARCH METHODS

In this chapter, I explain how I addressed my research questions through
developing case studies and conducting semi-structured interviews, participant
observation, and document analysis.
A Comparative Case Study
Yin states “A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary
phenomenon within a real-life context” (2014, p.16). Case studies allow researchers to
understand the how and why of contemporary events, and the problems and situations of
those events (Yin 2008). Yin explains “case studies contribute knowledge of individual,
organizational, social, and political phenomena; they allow an investigation to gain the
holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events” (2014, p.4). This research
approach is designed to “illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken,
how they were implemented, and with what result” (Yin 2014, p.15).
Comparative case studies can reveal patterns of commonality and difference from
one case to another (Fox-Wolfgramm 1997). Evidence gathered from multiple cases is
often considered more compelling, and the overall study more robust (Yin 2014).
Comparative case studies capture the interplay of what is going on in more than one
organization over time (i.e. ALM group). This methodology may illuminate barriers and
problem-solving techniques of organizations, and reveal complex mechanisms
responsible for the similarities and differences occurring across organizations.
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I analyzed two cases in this research: the Ashland Forest Resiliency (AFR)
Stewardship Project group and the Western Klamath Restoration Partnership (WKRP)
group. The WKRP and AFR groups were selected for their comparative differences
(Table 1). These cases were developed to answer the guiding research question: How is
ALM implemented in fire-adapted landscapes? I did this by documenting: 1) how groups
organize, and engage with policies and programs; 2) the legal, regulatory, and economic
environments of ALM collaboratives; and 3) how collaboratives implement ALM
restoration goals despite limitations.
Table 1. Primary differences between ALM cases
Attributes

AFR

WKRP

State of origin

Oregon

California

Planning area

22,000 acres

1.2 million acres

Project jurisdiction

Rogue River-Siskiyou
National Forest, City of
Ashland

Klamath National Forest &
Six Rivers National Forest,
Karuk ancestral territory,
private nonindustrial forest
owners

Community setting

Semi-urban

Remote, rural

Group timeline

Older – est. 2004

Younger- est. 2013

Group makeup

4 Primary partners

Multi-organizational led
collaborative

The Ashland Forest Resiliency Stewardship Project, AFR
The AFR group coordinates a project taking place in the Ashland Creek
Watershed and is based in Ashland, Oregon. The group is a collaborative partnership
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among the USFS, the City of Ashland, Lomakatsi Restoration Project, and The Nature
Conservancy. These partners aim to reduce the risk of severe wildfire in the watershed,
which provides Ashland’s water supply, through a series of actions. Table 2 outlines the
values and strategies forming the basis of this work. The group has collaborated with
local organizations and landowners, interested citizens, and faculty and students at
Southern Oregon University. In 2004, the community-based Ashland Watershed Steward
Alliance group submitted a Community Alternative to a USFS proposed plan for
managing national forest lands for fire resilience. Notably, the Community Alternative
was largely integrated into USFS planning, and is indicative of the long-term, supportive
environment of collaboration characterizing this region.
Table 2. AFR watershed values and strategies to accomplish project work.
Watershed Values
•

Human life and property

•

Older forests

•

Abundant, clean drinking water

•

Wildlife habitat

•

Ecological sustainability
Strategies

•

Thinning smaller trees

•

Saving the largest trees

•

Preserving habitat for wildlife
dependent on older forests
Protecting unstable slopes and
erodible soils

•

Preserving stream side habitat
thereby ensuring water quality

•
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The AFR was selected for this research because it meets criteria for an ALM
group and has implemented fire restoration activities. Also, it is in an area rich with a
collaborative land management history offering important lessons.
The Western Klamath Restoration Partnership, WKRP
The WKRP is a larger scale effort than AFR and is located in California,
providing a state-state comparison between California and Oregon. The geographic
setting of the WKRP differs greatly from the AFR (Table 1). The WKRP group includes
the: Karuk Tribe, Mid-Klamath Watershed Council, Salmon River Restoration Council,
Happy Camp Fire Safe Council, Six Rivers National Forest, Klamath National Forest,
and The Nature Conservancy (TNC). Additionally, the WKRP draws on broad local,
regional, and national organizational network for information and resources. The 1.2
million acre planning area was established in 2013 encompassing the Karuk tribal
ancestral territory. Implementation of work has largely occurred through the Prescribed
Fire Training Exchange program led by TNC, and a large-scale pilot project is slated to
begin in spring, 2017 to treat 6,500 acres.
The WKRP has developed landscape scale strategies for restoration (Table 3). A
defining feature motivating the group is their high fire frequency and a sense of urgency
among land managers who want to see fire resilient forests and surrounding communities
protected. It is estimated that $450 million has been spent in this area on fire suppression
during 10 fire seasons from 2000-2015 (Harling 2015).
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Table 3. WKRP landscape scale restoration strategies from fire history map targeting high
risk areas.
Landscape scale strategies

Creating defensible space around structures
and critical infrastructure.

Safe and reliable access and egress routes
on existing road network.

Safeguard public/private boundaries
through fuelbreak systems.

Fuelbreaks constructed along existing
firelines, ridges, trails to establish
“fireshed” or wildfire containment area.
Targeted fuel treatments for cultural and
ecological purposes to adhere to tribal
practices utilizing fire as a tool.

Maintain existing fuels treatments on
public/private lands for effectiveness.

Methods: Data Collection and Analysis
I conducted a total of 57 semi-structured interviews with collaborative partners,
group associates, and local residents of the two cases from May to August 2015. Semistructured interviews involved an interview guide with listed questions to increase the
likelihood that all topics would be covered; as well as to allow data to be compared
across interviews and case studies (DeWalt and DeWalt 2002, p.122). Targeted
interviews began with collaborative leaders, followed by snowball sampling from their
recommendations of partners and landowners. Table 4 provides a breakdown of the
interviewees, and Appendices 1 and 2 list numbered interviewees and their affiliation to
protect their anonymity. Questions were centered on gaining understanding of events,
insight from people involved in planning and implementation, and perspectives from
landowners. For the interview question template, see Appendix 3.
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Table 4. Interviewees by case study and affiliation
Collaborative
group

Number of
interviewees

AFR

30

WKRP

27

Interviewees
-

Federal/state agency: N=5
Retired federal agency: N=5
Local non-profit organization: N=5
National non-governmental organization: N=3
Local government: N=1
Logging industry: N=3
Academia: N=1
Non-industrial private landowner/resident: N=7
Karuk Tribe: N=4
Federal/state agency: N=6
Retired federal agency: N=1
Local non-governmental organization: N=6
National non-governmental organization: N=3
Non-industrial private landowner/resident: N=7

Fifty of the fifty-seven interviews were audio recorded, transcribed, and coded
using the methods of Corbin and Strauss (2014). The remaining seven interviews were
conducted either by phone (n=3), or in-person (n=4), with notes taken but no audio
recording, and then coded. Codes were then organized and analyzed using ATLAS.ti
qualitative data analysis software by following Susanne Friese’s reference guide (2014;
see Appendix 4 for code list). Interview data were compiled with notes from participant
observational events and document analysis in order to cross reference data and promote
understanding.
I participated in six events including workshops, field tours, and one conference
from May 2015 to April 2016. Participation enhances both the quality of the data
obtained during fieldwork as well as the interpretation of that data (DeWalt and DeWalt
2002). I participated in WKRP planning workshops and attended AFR events such as a
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field tour and conference. WKRP planning workshops exhibited the collaborative process
of the group which provided a unique opportunity to observe challenges faced by the
group and their active problem solving.
The AFR events illuminated a different stage of an ALM effort. Field tours have
been part of a larger community engagement plan showing project actions and are offered
to encourage continuous public involvement. The AFR conference was held at the
request of WFLC national fire managers, the purpose was an inquiry into a successful
version of ALM. This rare opportunity provided a glimpse into the interaction of diverse
stakeholders convening around new ideas for the future of fire management. Participation
opportunities greatly contextualized many of the concepts people spoke about and that
were discussed in documents I had read. This data collection method locates the
researcher “on-the-scene” of performed work and greatly enriches supplemental data
(DeWalt and DeWalt 2002, p.8).
I conducted document analysis in concert with interviews and participation, to
verify and support the information I had gathered. Document examples I engaged with
include: USFS reports, USDA and USFS policy, Karuk Tribal Eco-Cultural Resources
Management Plan, the WKRP Restoration Management Plan, newspaper articles,
speeches and presentations, and governmental/non-governmental website searches.
The following chapter discusses how the AFR and WKRP are engaging with
principles of the Cohesive Strategy and shifting away from pure fire suppression. Both
groups’ challenges as well as creative solutions I often found to be place-specific and
rooted in the geographic context where they are located. There are many similarities
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between them but there are important differences that show how ALM may be
implemented in different contexts.
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CHAPTER IV. RESULTS

Both ALM groups, the Ashland Forest Resiliency Stewardship Project (AFR) and
the Western Klamath Restoration Partnership (WKRP), are landscape-scale
collaboratives conducting cross-boundary (all-hands, all-lands) restoration but are doing
so on very different scales, in different ways, and for different purposes (Tables 5, 6).
This chapter largely expands on the contents in these tables.
Table 5. ALM case study similarities shared by AFR and WKRP
ALM Group Similarities
Geography: Klamath Mountain Ecoregion
Fire regime: Mixed-severity (however forest conditions commonly causing high
severity)
Land use history: timber production
Social capital: long regional collaborative histories (early 90s)
Knowledge base: Combination of scientific, local and traditional ecological knowledge
Facilitation: The Nature Conservancy (TNC) linking together diverse partners
Table 6. Differentiating characteristics between ALM cases
ALM Group Differences
Environmental
Natural setting
Planning scale
Political
Jurisdiction

Economy

AFR

WKRP

Semi-urban
22,000 acres

Remote - rural
1.2 million acres

City of Ashland, Rogue
River-Siskiyou National
Forest
Tourism/recreation

Karuk Tribe, Six Rivers &
Klamath National Forests,
private landowners
Restoration/marijuana

Four-organization
collaborative
Watershed health, drinking
water security, community
involvement

Multi-partner collaborative

Social
Governance
Goals

Landscape health, function
& community well-being
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ALM Group Differences
Funding

AFR
Estimate
- USFS:
$6.2 million
- Joint Chiefs:
$5.2 million
- State:
$2.5 million
- Ashland & NGO match:
$2 million

WKRP
Rough estimate
- USFS:
$550,000
- Karuk Tribe:
$240,000(+)
- Joint Chiefs: unknown
(see p. 77)
- State & Private Forestry
$1 million
- NGO: unknown

Cross-boundary
restoration work
completed
6,800+ acres

3 TREX burns. Restoration
planning phase (20132016). Pilot project (2017).

Ashland is located at the base of Mt. Ashland, in an urban setting, and the city
boundary abuts the USFS Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest (RRSNF) – which
provides Ashland’s water supply. These two landowners (i.e. jurisdictions), the City of
Ashland and the USFS, comprise the all-lands aspect of the AFR group’s project
boundary (Table 6). An Ashland city official described the unique relationship the City
has historically had with the USFS:
The Secretary of Agriculture and the City signed a formal cooperative
agreement in 1929 to protect the city’s water supply. The Forestry Division
Chief position is a little unusual for a municipal fire department to have a
forest division, which is usually relegated to the US Forest Service or state
agencies. The City is unique in that we have 1000 acres of municipal forest
land [inside the RRSNF] that are managed for a combination of fire safety and
[eco] system services kinds of goals. (Interview 44, Ashland City employee)
In contrast to AFR’s water supply focus, the WKRP group is aiming to redefine the
culture of fire management by reestablishing the human-fire relationship (i.e. broad,
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accepted use of prescribed fire). One member described a defining principle driving the
group in accomplishing their ecological goals:
We wanted to be able to bring fire back and bring that human interaction and
reestablish it back to those—the ecological process of function of fire, and
restore the human-fire relationships across the landscape. (Interview 3, Karuk
tribal member)
Many small communities in this rural, backcountry setting dot the vast landscape, but the
plan area is dominated by SRNF and KNF lands – which also hold Karuk ancestral lands
in legal trust. Less than 10% of WKRP’s 1.2 million acre planning area is private land.
Early, Innovative Collaboratives Creating Social Capital
It was really funny . . . they came out together and said something like,
“We’ve been talkin [environmentalists and timber representatives], and we
agree on what ought to be done with our ecosystems down here, and we
shouldn’t be at each other’s throat. We should be thinking about the
commonality of what we agree on and how to implement collaboration.”
[former agency member recalling an early 1990s public meeting with the
Applegate Partnership]
Two regional community-based groups preceded the AFR and WKRP - the
Applegate Partnership and the Watershed Research and Training Center (WRTC),
respectively. These groups, originating in the early 1990s, grew a network of forest
professionals that experimented with collaboration and spawned regional social capital.
The quote above depicts the novel approach of the Applegate Partnership which brought
together very divided forest management stakeholders (e.g. residents, local managers,
forest industry) to reach common ground on mainly private lands (Jakes et al. 2007,
KenCairn 1995). In contrast, the WRTC focused on public lands and strove to [re]employ
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foresters out of work – due to the decline of the timber industry. They did so by
encouraging collaboration and restoration with the USFS (Danks 2000, Abrams et al.
2015). Both the AFR and WKRP have benefitted from these early collaborative efforts as
they have built skills among local professionals (i.e. human capital) to work alongside
federal agencies in projects, and social capital in developing both local organization and
agency capacity to develop binding agreements (e.g. Memorandum of Understanding,
MOU) and work together.
The late 1980s and early 1990s is a time commonly referred to as the Pacific
Northwest Timber Wars - an era of great conflict in regional forest management
(Charnley 2006). The Timber Wars were marked by intense conflict between the
environmental community and the logging industry; as was evidenced by protests and
litigation that resulted in policy gridlock. Opposition largely centered around clear-cut
logging, old growth tree harvesting, and endangered species. At this time, the Applegate
Partnership and WRTC were working to diffuse tension, find forest management
solutions, and create jobs in light of a slowing timber industry.
The Applegate Valley in southwestern Oregon, and Hayfork, California, where
the community groups were based were selected as Adaptive Management Areas
(AMAs) under the Northwest Forest Plan. AMAs prioritized collaborative restoration and
were areas set aside to test principles of ecosystem management (i.e. management
practices mindful of ecological impacts), and encouraged shifting from top down,
agency-driven forest management to incorporate local stakeholder collaboration,
learning, and experimentation (Stankey et al. 2006).
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The Applegate Partnership pioneered strategic landscape-scale management as
depicted by the following quote that talks about their fire plan – one of the first that was
community developed:
We took all the boundaries off the property. We actually sat down with all of
the agency folks and said let’s take the boundaries off the BLM land. Let’s
take the boundaries off the private lands. Let’s take the boundaries off the
forest service land. Let’s take the county lines out. Let’s take the state lines
out and let’s look at this landscape. Where do we begin? Regardless of
ownership. (Interview 41, Applegate resident)
The quote references the 2002 Applegate Fire Plan - one of the first Community Wildfire
Protection Plans (CWPPs). In Hayfork, the WRTC similarly co-developed and early
CWPP and also focused on workforce training; developing alternative economies
utilizing small diameter wood and restoration by-product; and creating a formal
partnership between the USFS and local forest professionals.
The Applegate Partnership, WRTC, and partners in their collaborative networks,
have influenced federal fire management policies by engaging in collaborative
management inclusive of diverse partners. For example, the Applegate Partnership helped
secure substantial funding through the 2001 National Fire Plan, while WRTC utilized
stewardship contracting – an underused, but formal mechanism for local groups to
partner with the USFS (Rural Voices 2015). These activities have built local capacities
for collaborative forest management and ALM efforts today.
The Applegate Partnership and WRTC have helped build partner networks and
opened access to resources for other collaborative efforts. A direct example of this
occurred in 2009 with early WKRP members. In 2009, Hayfork, California hosted the
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State of Our Forests Conference, which resulted in linking TNC (a partner of the WRTC)
with the WKRP.
AFR: How it Developed
The origin of AFR began in 1929 with a cooperative agreement between the City
of Ashland and the USFS to jointly manage the Ashland Creek Watershed, the city’s
water supply. The cooperative agreement between these two entities restricted resource
extraction in the watershed largely because the geology is composed of unstable slopes
with high rates of erosion (Bennett 2010). This unique agreement has nurtured a longterm relationship with local and federal agency managers and because of this has
enhanced local capacities to work alongside federal agencies. In the mid-late 1990s a
controversial project was proposed by the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest
(RRSNF). The outcome of the controversial project would ultimately reflect much local,
professional input that significantly shaped AFR’s project design.
The Ashland Creek Watershed is in the RRSNF, and contains 1000 acres of
private, municipal lands (fig. 3). The cooperative, joint management arrangement and
multi-ownership jurisdiction laid the foundation for how ALM is being carried out by the
group. Additionally, the City of Ashland has been inclusive of citizens in the
development of the AFR, which has helped build community support for the restoration
plan – furthering the mission of ALM into the future.
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Figure 3. Ashland Creek Watershed outlined by blue dashed line. Note the pink parcel inside the watershed
boundary - constitutes 1000 acres of Ashland municipal lands. Black dash outlines expansion project.

AFR’s restoration plan was the eventual outcome of the controversial 1996 USFS
project called the Ashland Interface Fire Hazard Reduction project (HazRed, fig. 4).
Critics of HazRed argued the project did not follow the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire
Management Policy (fig. 4), which emphasized shifting away from pure fire suppression
toward reintroduction of fire and conducting broad forest restoration. HazRed was further
criticized for having a more commercial logging focus rather than a restoration focus.
After multiple project design iterations and innovative local input, AFR plans were
finalized in 2004 largely by the Community Alternative Team (fig. 4).
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Figure 4. Timeline of policy events leading to the development of the AFR collaborative and project

AFR becomes the solution for the HazRed conflict
The Ranger at that time said, “Let’s work with the community a little closer.”
They [USFS] came up with a different project [alternative] that was more
informed by the public and had some concessions in it, like a 17-inch diameter
limit, in other words, no trees bigger than 17 inches would be cut. That
actually got signed in the early 2000s. (Interview 32, Forest Service agency
member)
This quote references HazRed, how it was met with resistance, but how it
ultimately led to agreement and different design priorities. Though the stated objectives
of HazRed were to reduce fire hazard levels and address fire risk, opposing stakeholders
disagreed that project plans reflected this (Ingalsbee 2003). Area activists led
demonstrations, rallies, and hikes into the proposed project area. The extraordinary USFS
district ranger at the time was willing to listen and to collaborate, and brought diverse
stakeholders together. The region was not new to collaboration, but for an agency
administrator to initiate such efforts was unusual.
With the involvement of Ashland’s Mayor and a responsive RRSNF district
ranger, local stakeholders drafted a planning alternative to the ones developed by the
RRSNF. The RRSNF was receptive to the community-developed alternative and largely
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integrated it. However, some stakeholders remained unsatisfied and argued it adhered too
rigidly to fire suppression (Bennett 2010). HazRed was withdrawn for a second time. The
next draft plan redefined parameters, and again incorporated public input from the same
local group of professionals, and project goals were again refocused. This new iteration
was named the Ashland Watershed Protection Project or AWPP, and was the precursor to
AFR. AWPP prioritized the objectives of “high quality drinking water and maintain[ed]
large areas of old growth habitat by creating a fire resilient landscape resistant to high
severity wildfire” (Ingalsbee 2003, p.232).
The district ranger, who came from an education and communication background,
provided skilled facilitation. The local group the agency partnered with included: agency
personnel, local experts, forest industry professionals, and community members. In 2004
stakeholders proposed expanding AWPP under the newly formed CWPP policy tool –
and AFR’s restoration plan materialized. The local group reconvened under a new name
called the Ashland Forest Resiliency Community Alternative Team (AFRCAT), recruited
new members like TNC, and again drafted a community alternative (fig. 4). An AFRCAT
member spoke about TNC’s involvement and key contributions:
The Nature Conservancy kind of fell into it through creating that CWPP and
the alternative. They’re interested in expanding their role as an organization
and not just managing preserves, which they traditionally have been known for,
but now looking at the landscape and seeing how much need there was for
forest restoration and protection of key resources, that they had a lot to
contribute and were very interested. This became an opportunity for them to
look at federal land and participate in a process in a really key watershed.
They became kind of a natural player in Ashland and in our work. (Interview
44, Ashland City employee)
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AFRCAT’s community alternative largely influenced the project alternatives the RRSNF
developed for AFR’s restoration plan:
The Forest Service said “Hey, if you want to participate in this new process
[CWPP], we’ll give you some time to put it [community alternative]
together.” Quickly the community rallied and organized a team. We put
together this coalition [AFRCAT] of environmental interests and community
and city as a forestlands commission. It’s a volunteer group of folks but highly
knowledgeable. We put together this infrastructure. It was successful, and was
sent to the Forest Service in the form of this CWPP in 2004 and eventually
they accepted it. The final decision was maybe 80 or 85 percent of the
community alternative. (Interview 44, Ashland City employee)
The Record of Decision for AFR’s Environmental Impact Statement was signed in 2009
and its Purpose and Need statements highlight AFR’s objectives. AFR’s Purpose stated it
would “protect Values at Risk, reduce hazardous fuels, reduce crown fire potential and
obtain conditions that are more resilient to wildland fires” (USFS 2009, p. I-6). The
stated Need was “for urgent reduction of the potential for large-scale, high-severity
wildland fire” (USFS 2009, p. I-6).
The political environment in the early 2000s was favorable toward collaboration
to reduce wildland fire risk. The 2001 National Fire Plan (NFP) worked to resolve
gridlock by encouraging partnerships and emphasizing the safety of rural communities
and restoration. An AFR partner working during the rollout of the NFP offered this:
I think building the trust just takes time from succeeding in putting initiatives
together [largely catalyzed by NFP funding] and working though the kinks.
Having sideboards, really strong operational agreements that need to be
developed right up front. We’re doing it right now. (Interview 36, Non-profit
organization member)
The NFP delivered substantial funding to southwestern Oregon for fuels reduction work
as this area was a hotbed of collaborative activity. The influx of funding would be
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temporary, but this period would help build organizational capacities and put new fire
management policies and tools like CWPPs to work.
The AFR group and restoration accomplishments
NEPA challenges and recommended solutions.
The Record of Decision (ROD) for AFR, the last step in NEPA’s procedural
process, was finally signed in 2009. It took over four years for the Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) to reach a ROD in light of the extensive, collaborative effort. This delay
was mostly due to legal challenges to AFR’s restoration plan, enabled through the NEPA
public review process (Boucher 2016a). According to AFR participants, the NEPA
review process imposed time delays, stress on partners, and frustration on managers who
wanted to see more legal protections for such laboriously developed projects.
Interviewees spoke about the important function of NEPA and it enabling public input,
but saw a need for refining how projects were legally challenged.
Increased legal protections for collaborative projects were desired by managers
particularly after development of an EIS, since it is the most extensive, environmental
analysis under NEPA. Further, the most credible and trusted EIS is produced by an
inclusive and diverse collaborative partnership as it represents a wide array of stakeholder
interests. Several interviewees argued that a ROD from an inclusive and representative
collaborative should garner more legal authority and be challenged less. In describing
barriers like this, one BLM agency member said:
The analysis work that it takes to get a project from the ground up and into
implementation. It has just increased tremendously over the years and for a
number of reasons. Certainly increasing the defensibility of projects when they
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get challenged, legally challenged. That has certainly increased our cost.
(Interview 40, BLM agency member)
AFR partners repeatedly iterated the time and energy required for NEPA, and the delays
caused by the process because of the pressing need to scale up the size and number of
projects. The need for scaling-up projects was the primary argument for more legal
authority to collaboratives to expedite the extensive planning processes.
Moreover, AFR partners and area managers have made extensive efforts at
broader public inclusion into project planning, bolstering their case for an expedited
NEPA process. AFR partners have incorporated public interests and concerns through a
formal process called the Community Engagement Plan (City of Ashland 2011).
The Community Engagement Plan enhances support for AFR restoration by
building trust through public inclusion, but it is also used to help guide project priorities.
This Plan has involved the City: hiring a Community Engagement Coordinator,
development of a public website, and offering watershed tours to help educate, inform,
and provide transparency about project actions. This outreach by AFR partners was
intended to build support for restoration rather than getting caught up in litigation. An
AFR partner described a successful instance due to public outreach:
When we first were doing our helicopter logging here about—gosh, it’s been
almost three years now. We would be having log trucks coming through
downtown. We actually did a real aggressive campaign to try and make
people aware of it, like going door to door all along the haul route and
meeting with businesses in town, going to their place and saying, “Hey, this is
gonna be happening.” (Interview 32, Forest Service agency member)
Interviewees talked about how having a truck loaded with timber in the past, and driving
through town would be quite controversial. Through public inclusion from the start,
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interviewees indicated that public tensions around forest management have been reduced
for the first time in decades.
AFR group coordination (all-hands) and project work (all-lands).
Once NEPA cleared, the AFR group took three months to develop a Master
Stewardship Agreement (fig. 5). The Master Stewardship Agreement (MSA) formalized
the partnership between federal and non-federal partners to jointly conduct restoration
work (USDA - USFS et al. 2010). MSAs differ from general USFS stewardship contracts
because an MSA covers a larger area and addresses a series of projects compared to a
single one (Bey 2015). AFR partners quickly produced the MSA due to the availability of
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) funds for project work, totaling $6.2
million. ARRA funds financed restoration through 2013 (City of Ashland et al. 2010, fig.
5). A RRSNF employee described some key features of the AFR group that enabled some
of their initial accomplishments:
I think part of AFR was just a perfect storm with just the right personalities and
the right people with skills came together. I intentionally tried not to lead the
process. I tried to let the group figure out what I’d say, like “Well, we’re gonna
have to have prescriptions written. So how are we going to accomplish that?”
Knowing how it happened with the Forest Service but not with a partnership.
We were fortunate to have people with all those kinds of skills in different
places. (Interview 32, Forest Service agency member)
This quote shows the critical nature of having human capital in the personalities of the
partnership with the knowledge and expertise to enable a USFS employee to collaborate.
Collaboration by an agency with diverse partners, particularly local partners, indicates
major shifts in agency culture in ways critical for ALM.
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Figure 5. Timeline of events with the commencement of AFR's project work

The AFR group was finalized in 2009 with the joining of the fourth and final
partner, the Lomakatsi Restoration Project (Lomakatsi), the restoration work
implementers. AFR partners jointly developed 7,600 acres of treatments across the
22,000-acre plan area. Planned treatments of 7,600 acres followed scientific rationale
whereby treating 1/3 of an area will markedly reduce the severe impacts of wildland fire
(Franklin et al. 2002; Quigley et al. 1996). As of 2016 over 6,000 acres have been treated
and partners are right on track with the 10-year MSA contract (City of Ashland 2016).
In addition to the restoration conducted on USFS lands, coordinated treatments
were carried out in 2013 between the RRSNF and the City of Ashland, on the City’s
1,000-acre parcel. Ashland’s forester worked closely with the RRSNF’s silviculturist to
coordinate treatments on adjacent lands (Boucher 2016a). The Forest Division of Ashland
Fire and Rescue carried out the work on city land while Lomakatsi led the work in the
RRSNF. Also, Ashland coordinated with the USFS for the helicopter removal of timber
via helicopter. A helicopter was utilized on both municipal and USFS lands while
Ashland used a USFS helicopter landing site, and utilized USFS roads to transport logs
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(Boucher 2016b). Such close coordination is due to the working relationship among
partners ongoing since the 1990s, but of course also rooted in the 1929 cooperative
agreement.
Noting the complexities in conducting joint restoration projects with partners like
the USFS provided instructive lessons for future work. One Lomakatsi manager
described some of the challenges in working with a federal agency like the USFS:
I’ve had to learn how the Forest Service works. Their system of authority, to be
able to navigate through it, because if you don’t know it, you become really
frustrated. I think building trust takes time from succeeding in putting
initiatives together and working though the kinks. Having sideboards, really
strong operational agreements that need to be developed right up front. We
have one agreement [MSA] in the Illinois Valley [unrelated to AFR]. We’ve
been through four district rangers, two forest supervisors. There’s those people
in the agency that are lifers. They don’t wanna move up the ladder, they wanna
live where they work and do a whole career there. Find those people. They live
here, they’re gonna do 35 years here. Find those people, they’re the ones that’ll
outlive the ranger. (Interview 36, Non-profit organization member)
The same individual expanded on why fostering trust while working with the USFS
agency can be difficult to maintain:
I’ll be straight with you. Trust can be broken when staff allocation of time
capacity with the agencies is limited. Too much is put on the middle
managements plate to deliver [and] trust gets broken. (Interview 36, Non-profit
organization member)
Another AFR partner spoke about the decreased capacities of the USFS agency:
The Forest Service doesn't having the funding, doesn't have the staff capacity
to be treating the amount of land they want to, so they're leaning on their
partners through these stewardship agreements. (Interview 48, Non-profit
organization member)
These quotes illustrate some key challenges impeding progress by the AFR group:
agency turnover, and agency over-reliance on partners due to agency downsizing. The
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reduction of USFS commercial timber coupled with increasing fire severity has
restructured the agency. Consequently, there has been a significant reduction of revenue
which is compounded by fire suppression management that has funneled funding away
from restoration to deal with its increasing costs.
Funding challenges to restoration and compounding factors.
Restoration work, such as pre-treatments involving manual and mechanical fuels
reduction, is labor-intensive and very expensive. A federal agency member described the
nature of these projects:
These projects are expensive. They take a long time to plan. They take a long
time to put into effect, and you have to maintain it if it’s gonna have long-term
value. (Interview 56, Oregon Dept. of Forestry agency member)
A Lomakatsi manager spoke about restoration costs in the broader context of the Rogue
River Basin – landscape of the Ashland Creek Watershed:
Seventy thousand acres a year just in the Rogue Basin to keep up with
everything [restoration needs according to research]. We’re implementing now
probably close to 10,000 acres a year, 8 to 10, and that’s just employing—our
crews [alone] number about 30. So to treat 1,000 acres a year you need 10
workers. So you need a million bucks to employ ten people all year if they
were doing fuels reduction. So if you do the math, and start thinking about it
for 10,000 acres … It’s about 1,000 acres of work for $1 million. So if you put
70,000 acres in there, it gets really expensive. (Interview 36, Non-profit
organization member)
AFR partners repeatedly spoke about the need for long-term funding investments. Most
often public funding, relied heavily upon for restoration, comes in the form of short-term
grants. Short-term grants do not incorporate considerations for long-term, regular
maintenance of areas that have had initial treatments. Excluding regular maintenance can
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negate initial restoration and will not accomplish the goal of reducing fire risk (Agee
1993, Collins et al. 2011).
The AFR group has enjoyed success at obtaining grants and other public and
private sources of funding from a variety of funders from 2010-2016 (Table 7).
Table 7. AFR funding contributions by organization
Organization
USFS-RRSNF
Joint Chiefs
State of Oregon
AFR collaborative restoration by-product
Non-federal partners
City of Ashland resident tax

Contribution
$6,350,000
$5,200,000
$2,500,000
$1,500,000
$830,000
$700,000

As of 2016, AFR has been awarded over $17 million, which includes its 2015 restoration
plan expansion under the Joint Chiefs program to incorporate adjacent private lands (fig.
3, p. 38). This expansion grew the project footprint from 22,000 to 53,000 acres, and was
motivated by successes of joint planning and implementation by the group.
AFR’s expansion through Joint Chiefs.
In the early stages of AFR planning, obtaining project funding was uncertain but
the group persisted:
Another challenge was when we planned AFR, I knew it was gonna cost $10 to
12 million to do the work. We knew, at best, this whole forest gets $1 million a
year in fuels reduction funding. We have 1.8 million acres, so to do it in ten
years [as stipulated in the MSA] we needed, basically, $1 million a year. That
would be the entire forest budget for ten years. (Interview 32, Forest Service
agency member)
As illustrated, AFR partners received $6.2 million in ARRA funds which kick started
work and funded restoration from 2010-2013. During this time 4,000(+) acres were
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treated and as a result the group has obtained additional funding from a variety of sources
and grown the planning area.
The expanded area added onto AFR was called AFAR, or the Ashland Forest Alllands Restoration project. Joint Chiefs has contributed over $5.2 million so far with more
monies expected in the 3-year grant program. The progress of the group has grown the
project area and recruited additional (private) landowners – these new partners have
expanded the mosaic of stakeholders in the ALM project. The expansion and recruitment
of new landowners is in part due to the close relationship AFR partners have had with the
local Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS) office – the federal agency
responsible for restoration on private lands in a Joint Chiefs project. The NRCS has been
actively engaged with landowners in the area while fostering relationships with area
professionals. The NRCS and AFR partners have jointly worked together developing
AFAR, and Lomakatsi will again lead restoration work implementation.
A TNC representative spoke about how the group received Joint Chiefs funding
and about upcoming projections:
With the advocacy of the Mayor going back East [Washington D.C.] and
lobbying folks in the Forest Service and taking advantage of every opportunity
to meet with leaders, and then the Natural Resources Conservation Service, we
were successful in getting a Joint Chief’s award which will be launched this
summer. Got a million dollars for working cross-boundary on private lands.
(Interview 28, The Nature Conservancy representative)
A key factor of AFR’s success has been the contributing capacities by its partners.
Lomakatsi has contributed capacity for doing the work, TNC has enhanced collaborative
capacity through its expertise, the City of Ashland formally linked local stakeholders to
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agency partners, and the USFS is committed to being an equal partner while also
contributing significant funds. The next section describes some detail on partner roles.
Capacity building of TNC, Lomakatsi, City of Ashland, and the RRSNF
A TNC representative spoke about their role in AFR:
What we’ve been doing is enabling the middle, providing it with information,
with transparency, with vocabulary, with stories, with experiences, and
empowering the middle that could see its way through this dichotomy
[environmentalists against timber] that was counterproductive, [but] which
served its purpose. (Interview 28, The Nature Conservancy representative)
The same TNC member spoke about how they’ve engaged with federal and state
agencies in order to link them to their local partners:
[We’ve done] a lot of active engagement with the leadership of the Forest
Service, the NRCS, Oregon Department of Forestry sharing how we’ve been
successful which has been all about involving the community or engaging the
community with the best available science and developing a project and
implementing it in a transparent way. (Interview 28, The Nature Conservancy
representative)
To illustrate the above quote, Lomakatsi and the City of Ashland have been integral to
gathering support from the community, and TNC has helped accomplish this priority. By
“enabling the middle” and linking local and agency partners through a common language
and understanding, TNC has enhanced accomplishments among partners.
The City fills a key role in leading community engagement as illustrated through
the Community Engagement Plan. The City has fostered public trust and support as
evidenced by a tax on residents’ water bills that partially funds restoration work –
projected totals = $700,000 by 2016. A local resident spoke about the Ashland Forestry
Division Chief’s key role in fostering support:
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Ashland has accomplished something that is just so wonderful [with AFR]. I
remember, in 2000 or so, one of their firefighters [now the Division Chief],
was able to talk to people and get them receptive to it. In meetings, he was
talking to all the rest of us, from all of our different areas. He was talking with
the BLM and the Forest Service and all the fire chiefs. He’s very professional.
He’s charismatic. He carries himself well, and people listen when he talks. He
just knew how to get it done. The progress that they’ve made is just
phenomenal. (Interview 47, Applegate resident)
Aside from its funding and community engagement roles, the City also contributes
technical expertise to AFR as was demonstrated by the restoration work conducted on the
1,000-acre parcel inside the RRSNF. These roles illustrated the capacity contributions of
the City to the partnership.
Lomakatsi is a local, non-governmental organization implementing the restoration
for AFR / AFAR projects - contributing key technical skills. In addition, like the City, the
organization is a close partner to both the public and RRSNF. Lomakatsi started in the
mid-1990s working with the broad, small-scale, private landowners in Ashland’s
surrounding area. They have fostered relationships and developed ecological forestry
techniques in the past with these partnerships. Lomakatsi’s ecological forestry is rooted
in local and regional tribal knowledges, reinforced by forest science as represented for
example by researcher Jerry Franklin (Lomakatsi 2005). Lomakatsi has since shifted
from small-scale to larger scale, federal agency joint projects like AFR. In AFAR, the
organization has employed these previously developed skills of working with private
landowners and partnering with the USFS. A partner remarked on Lomakatsi’s capacities
and recruitment to AFR:
They were seen by the [RRSNF] forest supervisor at the time as a community
player, having capacity to implement work on the ground, whereas the other
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partners really didn’t have much capacity. The city had some but not much to
get work done on the ground and Lomakatsi had already established that they
could do that, and they were actively doing it. (Interview 44, Ashland City
employee)
Lomakatsi pioneered application of ecological forestry at a time when deep mistrust was
prevalent between the public and the timber industry. In the mid 1990s the co-founders of
the organization uprooted themselves from careers in the timber industry to forge a new
management model. They were guided by ecological principles sourced from area tribes,
also referred to as traditional ecological knowledge, or TEK. There is significant tribal
presence in the region of southwestern Oregon and northern California that both groups,
AFR and WKRP, have incorporated. According to an organization manager:
We took the prescriptions and the innovative restoration that we developed on
private lands across thousands of acres and were able to extrapolate it onto the
federal land side with the support of a community that was against logging
and against the agencies. They [community] backed us because we were
implementing the ecological fuels reduction approach. (Interview 36, Nonprofit organization member)
The same manager expanded on their methods for completing project work and how
they’ve built capacities to meet an increasing demand for restoration:
How we’ve built capacities, we’ve leaned on the contractors, the timber
operators that exist in southern Oregon, and we’ve incorporated them into
these large-scale projects by hiring them and leaning on their capacity that
already exists, and then training them in the ecological fuels reduction
approach and giving them opportunity. We’re really serving like an
administrative body of large-scale projects. We’re doing some of the work, and
then we’re soliciting bids and proposals to hire others to do the work. We work
with over 15 other operators and employ up to 150 people at one time, like
we’re doin’ right now. [We] work across 15,000 acres a year. (Interview 36,
Non-profit organization member)
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In addition to Lomakatsi’s work with the public and RRSNF, they also work with the
local, available restoration workforce which has links to the once bustling forest industry.
The organization utilizes this dwindling but remaining infrastructure to conduct work;
which is a particular mission of the group - to create jobs and grow a local, restoration
workforce.
A TNC representative spoke about particular skills Lomakatsi brings to the AFR
group, and also illuminates particular funding challenges in restoration:
There is a good analogy [about streams of funding] with the electrical grid.
You get these huge surges where you've got more power—in this case,
money—than you can deal with. We need a moderator. You need a transformer
to regulate the flow of money from the federal government, which is incredibly
boom and bust [short-term grants]. For us, the transformer is Lomakatsi
because of their ability to scale up and down to meet the need. They're able to
harness what would otherwise be energy just burned off as heat. (Interview 45,
The Nature Conservancy representative)
AFR group members have worked to address funding challenges that commonly face
restoration projects like this. An Ashland city tax for restoration work provides reliable
income, the group has attracted varied partners they can rely on, and restoration byproducts (wood chips, biomass etc.) have been harnessed.
As the RRSNF is the primary landowner and has jurisdiction on 95% of the AFR
project area, an agency partner reflected on how the agency navigated their role in the
group as an equal partner – a significant shift from their traditional role:
Typically, when the Forest Service would do a project or a contract we’ll write
prescriptions, lay it out, give specifications on how to do the work. On this one
we started, we didn’t have any of that. So the partners filled that role for us by
doing a lot of that work that the Forest Service would usually do. That really, I
think, was really key. That added capacity to getting it off the ground and
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moving—plus, I mean, having the advantage of [cost-share] funding.
(Interview 38, Forest Service agency member)
This illustrates the decreased capacity challenges of the USFS and the way AFR partners
were able to shore that up. However, AFR partners spoke highly of the integral role of the
USFS-AFR project manager. In the words of a TNC partner:
[The AFR project manager] has been key to our success. Somebody inside
Forest Service who really believes in this project and who has been willing to
rattle cages and just do a lot of the hard labor of pulling together plans,
prospects, and proposals, and all the spreadsheets and the budgeting. He also
brings to it his history of working as a smoke jumper and working with fire and
his experience working in silviculture and managing stands. (Interview 28, The
Nature Conservancy representative)
Each of the partners of the AFR contribute particular capacities to the group. This quote
illustrates that the USFS-RRSNF is no exception. In fact, this AFR manager has helped
pave a new way forward as an equal partner in a collaborative, redefining the role that the
agency may fill in ALM in the future.
WKRP: How it Developed
Stirrings of the WKRP first originated in the early 1990s when the Karuk Tribe
initiated collaborative prescribed burn projects with the Klamath National Forest (KNF).
The WKRP planning boundary follows the ancestral territory of the Karuk Tribe, but also
spans two national forests. In 1986 the Karuk received federal recognition status. They do
not have a reservation but have reacquired lands, as well as gained back lands through fee
to trust conversion (Tripp 2013). Land acquisition and fee to trust conversions totaled
1,660 acres as of 2013, and continuing acquisition of land is a high priority for the tribe.
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Reacquiring lands has triggered the Federal trust responsibility from the government to
the Karuk (Tripp 2013). The Federal trust responsibility mandates the federal government
“assist Indian tribes (monetarily) to protect their lands and resources” (Reuters 2016 p.2).
The Federal trust responsibility recognizes tribal treaties thus supporting tribal
sovereignty, and reinforces the government-to-government relationship the Karuk Tribe
has with the federal government (DOI 2012). This relationship enables the tribe to
prioritize conservation goals, and the Karuk Tribe Dept. of Natural Resources states their
mission is to “protect, enhance, and restore the cultural/natural resources and ecological
processes upon which Karuk people depend” (Karuk Tribe 2006, p.11).
In addition to the Federal trust responsibility, further rights are extended to tribes
by the 1997 Secretarial order #3206 from the Dept. of the Interior (DOI 2012). This order
specifies that under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), conservation actions taken by
federal agencies must harmonize with the Federal trust responsibility to tribes when
actions are taken under the ESA which affect tribal lands and tribal trust resources. Three
ESA species listed in the western Klamath Mountains are the northern spotted owl (Strix
occidentalis caurina), and Chinook (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha) and Coho salmon
(Oncorhynchus kisutch). Wild salmon, in particular, have historic, sacred, and
subsistence meaning to the Tribe (Karuk Tribe 2006).
Management of these species between the federal government and the Karuk, in
part, shapes the tribe’s role in managing tribal trust lands that span the Six Rivers
National Forest (SRNF) and the KNF (fig. 6). Many Karuk tribal members remain on
original territory along the Klamath and Salmon rivers in northern California; they
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comprise the second largest tribe in the state in terms of population, and are co-leading
the WKRP planning effort (Tripp 2013). Since 1986 the Tribe has grown its
administrative bodies from only a handful of employees and an operating budget of
$250,000, to 231 employees with a budget of $37 million (Tripp 2013). Initially, the
Tribe pursued fisheries management, but in the early 1990s began incorporating fire and
fuels. At this time the Tribe became increasingly alarmed at the deteriorating condition of
the forests and watersheds – linked to past practices of extractive logging and fire
suppression (USDA and DOI 2012).

Figure 6. WKRP planning area outlining Karuk ancestral territory, and spanning
Six Rivers and Klamath National Forests
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Since the early 1990s, multiple collaborative projects have been attempted in the
region of the WKRP, but none have been markedly successful except for the 2008
Orleans Community Fuels Reduction Project (OCFR). Although WKRP members who
participated in OCFR describe it for the conflict it spurred, they also noted how the end
result was clarity by tribal and local partners regarding what components were necessary
for successful, collaborative fire restoration efforts.
Conflict leads to clarity and goals for the WKRP
The OCFR project, originally the source of great conflict, motivated a range of
actions, ideas, and partnerships which led to a coherent vision forming the basis of
WKRP. OCFR was developed under the Healthy Forest Restoration Act emphasizing
collaboration and community involvement. The project, like AFR’s HazRed project, was
rooted in conflict but also was resolved through collaborative agreement. Interviewees
generally thought planning for OCFR went well and were quite hopeful about future
collaborative prospects with the USFS. However, once implementation began local
partners noted certain treatments were contrary to what was agreed upon. A local
manager reflected on what happened:
Public input [during NEPA process] went into this black box and they [USFS]
came out with something that was just totally different. There were some very
specific requests that were made by the tribe regarding cultural sites that were
disregarded. There were specific requests about certain logging companies to
avoid that the community and the tribe did not feel comfortable with but that
company was the one that was chosen. There were some things that were
just—whether it was the supervisor who changed them, whether it was that
they were marked different, things didn't get translated. Suddenly there were
specific cultural sites that were desecrated during the implementation.
(Interview 8, Non-profit organization member)
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OCFR resulted in litigation when the Karuk Tribe, along with local stakeholders, filed
suit against the KNF for violating the National Historic Preservation Act (DOI and
USDA 2012). As a result of what transpired, the Tribe and local partners reevaluated
their approach to collaborative restoration and formed the Mid-Klamath Restoration
Partnership (MKRP) to coordinate treatments going forward. The MKRP (precursor to
the WKRP) split priorities into instream and upslope work because of disagreements on
treatments and shifted focus to instream restoration where significant agreement and
funding existed.
The intention of MKRP was to build social capital and gather network resources
in order to address upslope issues once the opportunity arose. A WKRP partner described
this time:
When we got the Mid Klamath Restoration Partnership together in 2007, all the
players for the instream stuff were there and ready to go. There was very little
disagreement. Our overlap was great and our mission was clear. Whereas the
upslope it was the opposite, it was clear that key partners weren’t at the table
and were unlikely to come to the table. That the issue was contentious enough
that we didn’t have the skills to address it. We agreed right away that we were
going to breakout instream from the upslope where we’re gonna focus on the
instream work initially and wait until we gathered resources to address the
upslope. (Interview 1, Non-profit organization member)
After two years of successful instream work, the 2009 State of Our Forests Conference
was held, and was co-sponsored by the WRTC and TNC’s Fire Learning Network (FLN).
The instream work, along with future collaborative upslope goals, drew the attention of
the FLN Director - providing expertise and resources through programs early WKRP
partners needed to jumpstart meetings and planning.
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The FLN brought personnel and other resources to the mid-Klamath; they
provided much needed facilitation that unified all stakeholders around common goals. A
WKRP partner recalled this time:
[The FLN] brought those resources to the table that allowed us to have faith
that if we threw it out there to that contentious group [we would be able to]
come together. That we would be able to make that be a positive experience
through high level facilitation and having a process that allowed us to form
relationships rather than break them. (Interview 1, Non-profit organization
member)
The FLN provided skilled facilitators fluent in collaborative fire management, helped
recruit agency members to participate, and diffused tension that provided opportunities to
mend relationships among stakeholders.
Once gaining the support of the FLN, a series of actions took place that helped
build capacities of the group, including the development of a CWPP, engagement in the
Firewise program, and formation of a regional Western Klamath FLN. These actions
opened up local stakeholders to funding, knowledge, and information to share with the
community to help increase safety and reduce fire risk. The National Fire Protection
Association (Firewise), the USFS (CWPPs), and TNC (FLN) are national organizations
leading these programs and connecting local managers to a national network of fire
managers and other resources.
Other national partners and resources gathered by area partners from 2010 - 2014
included: 1) joining the Fire Adapted Communities (FACs) – extension program of FLN;
2) creation of a GIS Overlay Assessment (funded by local, regional, and national sources)
that helped guide project priorities by providing understanding of landscape fire activity;
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and 3) development of the Somes Bar Integrated Fire Management Project (guiding
WKRP pilot projects) – which drew largely upon an earlier CWPP (Harling and Tripp
2014, fig. 7). Figure 7 provides a timeline of events leading to the formation of the
WKRP and its key partners, discussed at length in the next section.

Figure 7. Timeline of events in the WKRP’s development through working programs, gathering tools, and
resources

In May 2013, the MKRP held their first formal collaborative meeting. By the
second meeting the group finalized its name, the Western Klamath Restoration
Partnership, to reflect the new plan area footprint. Directors at the Karuk Tribe and the
local, non-governmental organization Mid-Klamath Watershed Council (MKWC)
initially spearheaded the WKRP effort in part due to an almost two decade-old, wellrespected relationship:
What I’ve learned in tribal country is that sometimes results need to be
sacrificed for relationships… I’m always ready to turn funding away if it
damages relationships. I think that’s key. The OCFR project was just a lesson
on what not to do when you’re trying to build relationships and trust. I think
the tenet of this work is that it’s the process and the relationships built through
that process that will lead to long-term results. (Interview 1, Non-profit
organization member)
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This quote depicts the strong partnership and leadership within the WKRP. Once WKRP
was formalized, two additional “co-leads” were nominated, by the larger collaborative
group, totaling four in all. One nominee was from the KNF and the other was from the
expanded plan area and local, non-governmental organization Salmon River Restoration
Council.
The SRNF is the last remaining major partner in the WKRP. Together with the
KNF, these national forests make up over 90% of the planning area.
The WKRP Partners and Restoration Plan
The WKRP is a larger, and more sprawling ALM group compared to AFR in
several ways: there are more collaborating partners; it is an open collaborative to
residents while the AFR is more closed; the planning area is significantly larger; and
although collaboration has been repeatedly attempted since the 1990s less work has been
implemented on the ground due to the inability of partners to align (fig. 8).
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Figure 8. WKRP's group partners and the communities they are based in

The first tier of figure 8 represents the WKRP group as a whole; the second tier
are the national, federal, and tribal partners; while the third (and fourth) tier(s) are the
local stakeholder organizations. The integral local organizations (in addition to the Karuk
Tribe) include the Salmon River Restoration Council (SRRC) and their subsidiary
Salmon River Fire Safe Council (SR-FSC), as well as the Happy Camp FSC – are all
surrounded by the KNF (fig. 8). The remaining local partners, MKWC and their
subsidiary Orleans-Somes Bar FSC, are surrounded by the SRNF (fig. 8).
The WKRP has prioritized reaching agreement among partners, aligning
priorities, and engaging in joint planning - all within a complex, steep, and rugged
landscape. In order for all partners to align individual priorities, the group is following an
international model for collaboration led by TNC called the Open Standards Process of
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Conservation (OSP). One WKRP partner compared past attempts at collaboration to the
current one guided by the OSP:
Once I heard The Nature Conservancy was involved, that really was the key
point for me to get involved because I was involved in other collaborative
efforts or attempted collaborative efforts, but they were pretty much being
facilitated and run by Forest Service personnel. They weren't successful. They
went on for two years in some cases. The trust was never there, could never be
established.
To have an outside, independent party like this come in is great. That's where
my hope lies, by having an entity like that come in that maybe we can start
building greater trust and already [we] see that it opens up dialogue that I
haven't seen before. There's more equality among participants than what there
was before. The playing field has been leveled, so to speak. That really helps
bring forth more honest dialogue. (Interview 2, Klamath Mountains resident)
TNC’s employment of the OSP guides planning, implementation, monitoring, and
learning of projects. According to TNC, the OSP has been used successfully for almost
twenty years in diverse contexts internationally (TNC 2015). Many WKRP partners
expressed great optimism in following the OSP, especially with TNC’s skilled
facilitation.
The landscape complexity of the western Klamath Mountains is similar to AFR’s,
however the scale and strategic plans are quite different. WKRP pilot projects first began
out of the Orleans-Somes Bar community, but two more communities in the plan area
have developed pilot projects: Happy Camp and Sawyers Bar (i.e. Salmon River
subbasin) (fig. 9, shown below).
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Figure 9. The WKRP community-based ALM project areas

The three community-based project areas of the WKRP were designed to anchor
the restoration plan and serve to focus on different priorities of the group (Table 8).
Priorities, identified through the OSP, are wide-ranging and take on an ecosystem
management approach:
We’re looking at bigger effects on fisheries and seeing a clear connection
which has to be articulated over and over again, and continues to be between
fish and forests and fish and fire. Seeing that logging practices and sediment
from roads and the health of the forests was very much connected with the
health of the river systems and with the fisheries and the lack of fire. (Interview
8, Non-profit organization member)
Another partner expressed a similar sentiment, but adds the importance of community
well-being for the group:
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What is good for the forests, and the wildlife, and the rivers is ultimately really
good for everyone. I think it increases the quality of life, the ability of
subsistence, so it’s really quality of life that is the essence. If you have really
healthy, vital fisheries, and wildlife, and watersheds, you’re breathing clean air,
and you have clean water. It’s the best place on earth. (Interview 10, Karuk
tribal member)
Because of the group’s engagement with the OSP, involving diverse partners, priorities
were developed encapsulating their mission. These priorities linked ecological, human,
and economic goals (Table 8).
Table 8. WKRP priorities developed collectively through the Open Standards Process
Conservation targets/values
- Fire Adapted Communities (FACs)
- Restored fire regimes
- Healthy river systems
Threats to conservation targets/values
- Lack of stable jobs

- High fuel loading
- Lack of defensible space
- Impaired fishery
Group strategies developed
- Accelerate development of FACs
- Increase local restoration capacity

- Develop partnerships for implementing
zones of agreement.
- Support implementing fisheries
restoration plans
- Integrate food security into forest
management

- Resilient bio-diverse forests/plants/
animals
- Sustainable local economies
- Cultural and community vitality
- Erosion of community and cultural
values, including Karuk traditional
practices
- Altered forest structure and composition
(overly dense forests)
- Habitat degradation (terrestrial and
aquatic)
- Lack of defensible space
- Develop and implement landscape level
strategic fuels reduction treatments.
- Increase use of fire to restore & maintain
pre-European conditions in a
contemporary context
- Create sustainable diverse revenue
streams to address all threats and values
- Develop integrated, inter-generational
education programs and activities that
complement our identified strategies.
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Leadership of the WKRP is twofold. There is a “core team” that guides the group,
while four elected “co-leads” represent the different communities, coordinate priorities,
and direct local projects (Harling and Tripp 2014b, p.10). One partner summarized the
vision and overall goal of the group:
Really at the core is understanding that there is a human fire relationship that’s
been broken. Our current policies don’t support that. They take the use of fire
out of the hands of the people and they put it in the hands of a few federal
officials that are removed from its effects on the landscape scale. How we
build back that human fire relationship at the community level, that’s our
ultimate goal. Is change that understanding of fearing fires to feeding the fires,
to embracing it, as well using it as a primary tool for managing this landscape.
(Interview 1, Non-profit organization member)
This quote provides insight into the frustrations of local managers excluded from past
federal agency-led, top-down projects. However, interviewees seemed to have a renewed
sense of hope for collaboration that finally incorporated local priorities.
Although the WKRP was predominantly in the planning phase of ALM at the
time I conducted interviews, the group had received significant funding from state,
federal, and tribal sources (Table 9). A primary objective of WKRP, like Lomakatsi, is
building a local restoration workforce, and partners understand an imperative of this is
developing diverse revenue streams that will leverage major funding sources from state
and federal agencies.
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Table 9. WKRP funding mechanisms and/or resource contributions
Source of funds
Amount (approximate)
Karuk Tribe
Annual contributions from Federal trust
responsibilities – from BIA through USFS
USFS State and Private Forestry
$1.1 million to non-federal partners
Six Rivers National Forest
$500,000 (also committed to annual
contributions)
Klamath National Forest
$26,000 (2014 WKRP restoration plan)
Joint Chiefs: Mid-Klamath River
$3 million (2014, 2015 – small portion
Communities
allocated to WKRP, see p. 77)
California Fire Safe Council (CA-FSC)
Annual contributions/grants to Happy
Camp, Salmon River, and OSB FSCs
Community-based all-lands projects anchoring WKRP
Partners of the WKRP have recognized there is urgency for coordinating and
collaborating on work in the western Klamath Mountains because of the severe fire risk
in the landscape. A local manager reported that in the last decade (prior to 2015) over
400,000 acres burned and over $450 million dollars was spent on fire suppression
(Harling 2015). In response, the group devised strategies for scaling up restoration:
We can either choose to spend $450 million like we have in the last 10 years
on fire suppression or we can choose to spend $45 million, a tenth of that, on
strategic fuels reduction followed by prescribed fire…If we can agree to focus
our efforts, our combined efforts on establishing those fuel breaks, getting
good fire back on the landscape where we can. That will allow us to embrace
managed wildfire. (Interview 1, Non-profit organization member)
The WKRP is working to restore the role of fire to the landscape, and creating conditions
to do landscape level work through managed wildfire (i.e. allowing fire to burn in
contained areas). In addition, partners are focusing on community and fire fighter safety,
and their well-being, and getting fire back on the landscape at more opportune times
through prescribed fire – outside of extreme, high fire season.
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The first pilot projects were based out of the Orleans-Somes Bar (OSB)
community due to the support from the SRNF, previous accomplishments here by WKRP
leaders, and readily identified projects outlined by a CWPP. The three communities
anchoring the WKRP have each focused on different strategies: 1) developing landscape
level fuel reduction treatments - the focus of the OSB pilot projects; 2) developing
inclusive partnerships for implementing areas of agreement – focus of Sawyers Bar pilot
project; and 3) accelerating development of FACs – focus of Happy Camp pilot project.
The OSB pilot project is slated to begin 2017, totals 6,500 acres, and consists of
four project areas (fig. 10). Private landowners were notified through mailed letters by
MKWC staff. The letters informed them that their lands were being incorporated into the
project area; though one interviewee talked about the difficulty in contacting residents,
some of whom did not want to participate:
Yeah, so then the letter said I’d be following-up with phone calls, so I tried to
do that, but a lot of times, it’s just hard to leave a message that’s long enough
that they understand what I’m talking about, but short enough that I don’t get
cut off. I’m always getting cut off.
I think there’s a group where it’s privacy [resistance to incorporation] because
of marijuana, but there’s also a strong element in this community of just
privacy in general. That’s why they came out here. Yeah, distrust, privacy.
Let’s see, what else? Well, also, just pride. Like this one fellow up there,
Donahue [project site], he’s like, “I don’t need any help. I do it myself. I’ve
been doing it myself for 30 years, and now my son helps me,” or whatever.
(Interview 22, Non-profit organization member)
Inclusion of private landowners has depended upon WKRP leaders coordinating projects
to incorporate them. Landowners, who may at first be resistant, are personally contacted
and persuaded, to either conduct or accept fire risk reduction treatments so that all-lands
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are included in project areas. MKWC has become well-respected among local residents,
and has worked to build trust; this helps to bring these lands into projects. Local NGOs
and area residents in the western Klamath region have had fairly recent, past negative
dealings with federal agencies, and organizations like MKWC are critical for building
back trust in relationships.

Figure 10. WKRP pilot projects slated for restoration work in 2017. Note light colored parcels of private
lands within each project area
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Part of the mission of the OSB pilot projects is to apply lessons learned from the
WKRP’s multiple experiences (in 2014, 2015, and 2016) with TNC’s Prescribed Fire
Training Exchange (TREX) program. TREX trains for federal level wildfire management
by providing national certifications to local managers to conduct treatments on public
lands. A TREX manager spoke in favor of the program:
TREX is pretty radical with burning on federal land. It’s breaking down social
barriers that have limited collaboration for decades. Some of the TREX
projects have been done on private lands, public lands, some cross boundary
work, a military base, and a giant ranch. Funding is a major barrier though to
prescribe burning but TNC has shown that lots of acreage is accomplished
through volunteers. International participants have been encouraged to attend
and a group from Spain was at the 2014 TREX in the Klamath. (Interview 25,
The Nature Conservancy representative)
TREX is a major tool for conducting cross-boundary, landscape level treatments by
local managers on federal lands – a particular focus for future WKRP projects. A WKRP
member spoke about the innovation of TREX:
Whether it’s the prescribed fire training exchange [TREX] model based on a
type three incident management team, that’s locally based and potentially
available for fire suppression and prescribed fire. A lot of these things are
really helping the national folks to understand what a new fire management
paradigm looks like (Interview 1, Non-profit organization member).
The Klamath has therefore been a place of innovation exemplifying a new fire
management model for national managers and policy makers.
The remaining two community-based projects, Happy Camp and Sawyers Bar, are
located within the KNF. Figure 11 illustrates the Happy Camp pilot project - different
land uses and highlights the private lands on the eastern edge, near the town limits of
Happy Camp. The Happy Camp pilot is led by agency members from the USFS Happy
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Camp Ranger District and Happy Camp FSC - mainly composed of community
members. The Sawyers Bar pilot project is led by the Salmon River Restoration Council
(SRRC), the Salmon River FSC, and KNF agency representatives. While all three
community-based projects adhere to WKRP’s mission as a whole, each are focusing on
particular geographic areas. As an example, SRRC’s Yellow Jacket Ridge Project is an
experimental, science-based project to reintroduce fire to an area which has been the site
of recent wildland fire (fig. 12). Though this project is occurring solely on federal lands,
its effects will be examined by multiple partners, illustrating the all-hands, collaborative
aspect of ALM.
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Figure 11. Happy Camp pilot project. Note dark gray shading on eastern edge showing private lands
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Figure 12. Pilot project taking place out of Sawyers Bar in the Salmon River subbasin

Changing relationships among managers of the WKRP
The WKRP has received financial and staff support from the KNF but has also
had conflicts in partnering with them. To illustrate, one of the WKRP co-leads is a KNF
fire ecologist; the KNF provided the funding for the group’s restoration plan production;
and the SRRC in Sawyers Bar has worked closely, at times, with the KNF over the years.
On the other hand, the KNF proposed a controversial Westside Fire Recovery Project
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(Westside) after a fire event in August 2014, that resulted in litigation actions taken by
WKRP partners.
The Karuk Tribe along with a consortium of environmental groups, filed a lawsuit
challenging Westside once its draft EIS was presented for public review. The lawsuit
warned the project would cause negative impacts to salmon and that it failed to
incorporate fire on the landscape. Westside’s critics cautioned it reverted to a model of
salvaging timber, replanting, and fire suppression. The Tribe proposed an additional
alternative to the ones in the Westside EIS drafted by KNF, which decreased the salvage
area by 1/3 and prioritized WKRP’s principles of protecting rural communities, and
working towards reintroduction of beneficial fire. A WKRP partner talked about dealings
over the Westside project:
We’ve had months, and months, and months of time that Klamath National
Forest has been able to engage with us and for us to provide direction on their
Westside salvage, but because they drag their feet, did their own thing. That’s
not, to me, the way you deal with a landowner on your forest because we’re a
landowner and they don’t see us as that. In our mindset, it’s like we’re not the
owner of the land, but we are most definitely the most important component of
the landscape. (Interview 14, Karuk tribal member)
In this instance, the KNF excluded WKRP partners from the planning of the Westside
project.
Multiple WKRP partners spoke about differing national forest priorities and the
constituencies of the SRNF compared to the KNF. The KNF is headquartered in Siskiyou
County and has predominantly been a ranching/timber area, while SRNF is located in
Humboldt County, a more liberal area receptive to collaboration. The more liberal nature
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of Humboldt County is partly due to the existing environmental groups, as well as the
presence of Humboldt State University academics pushing SRNF in that direction.
Okay, so Humboldt County, Indian Country, green, green-oriented [liberal
nature]. The Federal government, and the State governments, local
governments are startin’ to understand a little bit more, it’s more receptive to
the communities - native communities, local communities, academic
communities. Siskiyou County – conservative, agriculture. That’s where I
grew up... it’s hard to get out to those communities because they’re set in their
ways. (Interview 11, Karuk tribal member)
She’s [KNF Supervisor] balancing a whole different pot of stakeholders which
includes Siskiyou County and a lot more timberland owners that are very
weary of trying to be part of the [collaborative] decision making process…
The Klamath [KNF] is the last bastion of the true timber beasts. They have
been getting their cut out there. (Interview 1, Non-profit organization
member)
As illustrated, Happy Camp and Sawyers Bar exist within the KNF jurisdiction.
WKRP partners residing in these areas are pushing forward with restoration plan
priorities and are very cognizant of the present challenges in partnering with the KNF.
Growing capacity for ALM in the Klamath also reveals barriers
Similar to the AFR, WKRP federal partners are relying on their collaborative
partners to lead out-of-the-box, innovative projects comprising all-lands, all-hands
aspects of a forest resilience model. Partners often cited the commonly used phrase, “all
hands-on deck,” to invoke what is necessary to carry out this new model.
After the failure of the OCFR project, WKRP partners began gathering resources
and building network capacity largely by continuing work through the California Fire
Safe Council (FSC) program – which funds many local FSCs. FSCs support small-scale,
community-based efforts to reduce wildland fire risk to private lands. This program has
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assisted in building local capacity around fire management in the Klamath region, where
local partners leading the WKRP have all worked through community-based FSCs for
over twenty years (fig. 13).
WKRP has worked to organize area fire managers (federal, state, local) and local
groups and communities through the collaborative; sought resources through partners and
programs; and accomplished agreement on fire management not only through partner
support and inclusive expertise, but through individuals who have fostered relationships
and trust (fig. 13). Figure 13 maps the groups who have worked to unify this partnership.
Notable groups’ roles enabling agreement involve: TNC (expertise, Fire Learning
Network, facilitation), USFS-SRNF (committed long-term funding and staff), MKWC
director (linking participating stakeholders).
Regional partners

National partners
•USFS
•TNC
•Fire Learning
Network (FLN)

•Region 5-USFS
(California)
•CA-Fire Safe Council
(FSC)
•USFS-PSW (research)
•WRTC

Local partners
•Karuk Tribe
•KNF
•SRNF
•MKWC / OSB-FSC
•SRRC / SR-FSC
•Happy Camp FSC

WKRP
Figure 13. WKRP partners across multiple scales unifying partners for collective agreement
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WKRP stakeholders for the first time are collectively moving forward on upslope
projects largely through the help of the FLN’s prescribed fire TREX program. The
prescribed-burn program has been instrumental since it furthers the mission of the group
to return “good fire” back to the landscape. Over 90% of the landscape is USFS land, and
the downsized agency has limited capacity for work. TREX acknowledges this and
demonstrates an alternative model through building local capacities. Capacities are built
through the program’s national certification training to conduct work on public and
private lands, and also by bringing volunteers in the form of fire crews in training.
Barriers to building capacities for ALM in the Klamath region partly involve
funding mechanisms and bureaucratic challenges that come with USFS partnerships.
Similar to AFR, a funding mechanism for the WKRP has also been Joint Chiefs, through
the KNF. Approximately $3 million in funding was provided by the program but because
of the condition that funds were to be used for work only, not planning, these dollars have
not assisted the group as much as they could have (USDA and NRCS 2016). Only a small
portion of Joint Chiefs funding was allocated to private lands within the OSB community
project, much more might have been if adequate personnel from the NRCS had been
available. One forester from the NRCS was dedicated to appropriate the funding, which
was not enough support for this plan area. The majority of Joint Chiefs funds went to
NEPA-ready projects already prepared by the KNF and without any input from the
WKRP – WKRP partners felt this was another missed collaborative opportunity by the
KNF (TNC 2013).
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Interestingly, a WKRP manager expressed a counterintuitive point how receiving
money is not always a positive thing when the capacity to appropriate it is not sufficiently
developed:
We’re on an unlevel playing field when they’ve [Forest Service] got $2-3
million in internal funding to support their work. That was part of the beauty
of WKRP is they [SRNF] recognized that the partners also need funding to
participate in a meaningful way. That was a huge shift. At that same time a lot
of our non-federal partners including MKWC and the tribe are going through
growing pains. Our staffing levels, funding levels, triggered our first audit.
Just because of the amount of money we made which then took up a bunch of
our staff time. At a time when we’re adding a bunch of staff to the payroll. A
lot of money is not necessarily a good thing unless we have the capacity to use
it in a good way and to weather those growing pains. (Interview 1, Non-profit
organization member)
This quote shows one of the major contributions of the USFS. It displays a cultural shift
between the USFS-Region 5 (i.e. California) and local SRNF offices to support groups in
ways they have not previously – granting funding for planning. Administrators in the
Forest Supervisor and District Ranger positions at SRNF provide key support. These key
positions are held by members of the Hoopa Native American Tribe, historic neighbor to
the Karuk. The tribal influence has been encouraged by regional partners (USFS Region
5) and is providing critical support catalyzing WKRP’s mission and supporting the
integration of TEK with western science. However, challenges remain that must be
addressed, particularly formal support for capacity building, if ALM is to have longevity.
Finally, WKRP partners have identified barriers to ALM and are strategizing
ways to overcome them. A WKRP member reflected on potential solutions that largely
involve fire managers and administrators, on all levels, agreeing on a collective plan:
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Whether it’s by engaging with CAL FIRE so they don’t create too restrictive
burn windows. Or whether it’s engaging our regulatory agency so they don’t
restrict our treatments, time windows or treatment options that won’t get the
job done because of potential impacts to [sensitive] species. All those issues
need to be addressed. As well as the—bringing the community along with us,
the information sharing, the shared learning. (Interview 1, Non-profit
organization member)
This quote highlights a general principle of ALM which is calling upon all managers
and stakeholders to jointly create agreements on what kind of fire management actions
a particular landscape will receive. It also depicts the complex nature involved in
accomplishing this – but shows how managers are engaged in spearheading the effort.
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CHAPTER V. DISCUSSION

Top-Down Support in Shifting to a Forest Resilience Model
This research examined two cases working to shift out of a pure fire suppression
mode of forest management to a resilience model by employing ALM - as encouraged by
the National Cohesive Wildland Fire Management Strategy (Cohesive Strategy). This
research sought to answer the research question – How is ALM implemented in fire
adapted landscapes - through three objectives: 1) how groups organize, and engage with
policies and programs; 2) the legal, regulatory, and economic environments of ALM
collaboratives; and 3) how collaboratives implement ALM restoration goals despite
limitations. I hypothesized that for large-scale, cross-boundary coordination to endure
there must be institutions, programs, and policies to support them.
Although each case offered different lessons for ALM planning and
implementation, I affirmed my hypothesis in that they both shared the need for a
supporting framework (i.e. institutions, programs, policies) and resulting infrastructure
for carrying out this new management approach. The AFR and WKRP demonstrate
different organizational structures of ALM, restoration project work on a landscape scale,
and the difficulties and opportunities ALM presents. Despite their differences, both cases
shared common frameworks, were guided by common policies, and were supported by
common programs such as Joint Chiefs. They also participated in common programs,
such as Firewise, and they had common participants, such as The Nature Conservancy.
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The Cohesive Strategy was the common policy adhered to by both cases in this
study and exemplifies Agrawal and Gibson’s finding that supportive policy is critical for
bottom-up resource management. This policy encourages a model of management that
addresses both the increasing costs and risks of severe wildland fire. Both groups, the
WKRP and AFR, align with Cohesive Strategy principles that join “all-hands” and “alllands” to accomplish it. Their implementation of all-hands, all-lands management is
termed ALM, a land management approach involving collaborative, science-based
ecosystem restoration at the landscape scale that occurs across ownership and
jurisdictional boundaries.
The challenges of developing a resilience model
This section briefly touches on what Kellert et al. (2000) describe as the challenge
of effective implementation due to the extraordinarily complex nature of CBNRM, but in
this case ALM. The Cohesive Strategy calls upon all-lands jurisdictions (local, regional,
state, federal, national) to collectively conduct fire management through ALM, a vastly
different approach than traditional top-down, agency driven management. As illustrated,
forest management is largely separated into two camps: fire suppression and resilience
(or restoration-based). The Cohesive Strategy prioritizes restoration by emphasizing the
need to restore forests to become resilient to fire by reintroducing it, and doing so through
a collaborative process of diverse partners on all levels, for the long-term (DOI & USDA
2010). However, there are no blueprints in doing this and collaborative groups must
design and innovate how this process will take place.
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Design and innovation in both cases provided lessons in ALM planning and
implementation. Planning that organized partners and established shared decision-making
included AFR’s Master Stewardship Agreement (MSA), while the WKRP employed
TNC’s Open Standards Process. Innovation around implementation was demonstrated by
both groups calling upon local stakeholders and existing traditional ecological knowledge
(TEK). TEK guided new practices working toward a resilience model, which is still
relatively unknown to most managers across the U.S. (Senos et al. 2012).
An innovative idea by a WKRP partner was to redesign forest management to
encourage ALM through an all-lands workforce. In other words, since ALM
implementation is locally based, it is largely dependent upon a local workforce. Thus,
local organizations should have the capacity for wide-ranging projects year-round,
including suppression to support the various priorities for a landscape. If local groups are
to address various priorities and manage and conduct wide-ranging projects, a full-time
workforce is likely necessary. Depending on geographic characteristics this may not be
possible everywhere. However, ALM which is local-centric, highlights the need for
significant workforce development and training. Programs addressing the need for
workforce development and training include TREX, Fire Adapted Communities,
California Fire Safe Councils, and Lomakatsi’s work model. These programs provide
examples of proactive ways managers are reducing wildland fire risk, that could be more
effective if scaled-up.
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Funding ALM through programs and economic generation
Development of funding sources that not only support a local workforce but that
cover the cost of restoration is paramount. Lomakatsi provides a work model that is doing
this and can offer lessons to be learned by others. AFR partners are contracted by an
MSA which binds them to a 20% cost match whereby the USFS provides 80% to conduct
work. The expense of restoration (particularly costs involved with initial treatments), and
a down-sizing USFS agency more reliant on partners, requires creative funding strategies
to support this work.
Not only is it important to have skilled partners who can raise funds through
grants, it is also important to generate alternative funding sources. Examples of this
provided by both ALM cases include: restoration by-product utilization (small diameter
wood, biomass, chips), biochar (fertilizer) production, selective logging, and “adding
value” to ecosystem services (i.e. water storage/filtration, soil building, carbon storage).
Although these ideas are practical and creative, they tend to fall short without significant
investment. The AFR case provides an example of an approach supplemented by
investment. Invested funding sources include the USFS, NRCS, and state of Oregon;
while economic generation has come from selective logging, restoration by-product
utilization, and taxing Ashland residents. The AFR funding strategies provide an
instructive model to extrapolate from where possible.
Constraints to ALM funding
Compared to AFR, the WKRP has also received funds from the NRCS (Joint
Chiefs), among others, but has not yet translated funds to on-the-ground work quite like
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AFR. Challenges to translating these funds included: lacking NEPA ready projects (i.e.
time, funding, capacity delays); presence of NEPA ready projects at the KNF; lacking
capacity of the NRCS to provide sufficient staff to the WKRP; the lack of a robust local
workforce; and the condition that funds be used for work implementation only, not
capacity building.
ALM is a long-term, complex model that requires large amounts of funding. It is
widely agreed upon that in order to achieve forest resiliency, regular fire treatments
(every 7-10 yrs.) must be applied. Failing to institute regular follow-up treatments risks
futility of doing any restoration work at all (North et al. 2012; Churchill et al. 2012;
Moritz et al. 2014). The AFR and WKRP show two different ways of engaging with
ALM that exhibit long-term cost savings compared to suppression.
These ALM cases and others like them that are applying Cohesive Strategy
principles of increasing safety, lowering costs, and preserving vital forests, are paving the
way for a resilient model of forest management. Pure fire suppression is an entrenched,
reinforced model supported by rigid bureaucracies resistant to change. Aligning with
Butler and Goldstein (2010), diverse groups like the AFR and WKRP that have high
levels of expertise, enhanced by TNC partners, foster creativity and innovation that carve
new pathways and break free from bureaucratic rigidity.
Bottom-Up Support for ALM: Social, Cultural and Human Capital
Social capital is the existing links or connections of a group where mutual gains
are fostered that benefit the parties of a group and their social network (Woolcock 1998;
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Putnam 1995; Lurie and Hibbard 2008; Wagner and Fernandez-Gimenez 2008). The
mutual gains are based on the reciprocal nature of the relationships that form the links in
a network, enhancing the capacities for achieving group goals. In the case of ALM,
mutual gains involved employment of Cohesive Strategy principles and working towards
a resilience model of forest management.
To accomplish Cohesive Strategy principles, its collaborative creators urge that
“all-hands” and “all-lands” join fire managers, residents, and their landscapes to jointly
develop locally-based fire management strategies. This new approach to fire management
flips suppression management on its head and redirects efforts to come from the local
level. I found social capital to be a fundamental necessity to overcome the old model, or
the “rigidity trap”, of fire suppression reinforced by the bureaucratic agencies resistant to
change.
Diverse stakeholders build capacity for ALM
I observed social capital to be critically sourced from locally-based partners such
as Lomakatsi, the City of Ashland, the Karuk Tribe, and MKWC. In alignment with
Kellert et al. (2000), bottom-up (locally-based) resource management is more successful
when partners have high levels of political and forest management sophistication. In
other words, these local partners have the ability to be an equal partner with their state,
national, and federal partners. As illustrated, both ALM cases’ local partners belong to
long established social networks that have been building social capital for over three
decades. Among ALM group partners and their broader social network, social capital has
garnered increased trust and mutual respect; public participation and thus support from
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the surrounding community; attainment of political recognition; an increased ability to
obtain grants; success in joint planning exemplified by work completed on-the-ground;
and a broader view of the landscape by bringing in diverse landowners and drawing on
additional resources.
Local partners like the City of Ashland and Lomakatsi, and the Karuk Tribe and
MKWC, through their ability to not only obtain grants and raise funds, but complete onthe-ground restoration have enhanced capacity for ALM through human and cultural
capital; and as a result, reinforced social capital. Wagner and Fernandez-Gimenez (2008)
find that existing social capital can positively reinforce itself - this was clearly displayed
in this study. The City of Ashland’s tax on residents, and Lomakatsi’s ability to obtain
grants and manage restoration implementation recruited funding and support from not
only the USFS, but with new partners, like the NRCS and ODF. Similarly, with the
Karuk Tribe’s invested federal trust funds, MKWC’s skill at obtaining grants, and
through successes in joint fisheries restoration, TNC and the FLN were recruited. TNC
and the FLN brought the TREX program, enabling cross-boundary prescribed burning,
which has enhanced local capacity for prescribed burning through training certifications.
Not only are locally-based partners playing an important role in building social
capital for ALM but so are regional, national, and federal partners. As illustrated, the
formalized multi-scalar nature of partners (local to national) in ALM groups, compared to
CBNRM, is a primary difference between the two models, and major contribution of this
research. Kittredge (2005) highlights the need for a force that brings all stakeholders and
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landowners together, and how NGOs are increasingly being it. Both ALM cases
displayed this by partnering with TNC, a national NGO.
TNC was critical for facilitating agreement among diverse partners, and enhanced
social capital as a result. AFR partners included TNC, while the WKRP partnered with
the FLN - a program co-led by TNC and who they directly worked with. TNC has
exemplified what Ostrom (1998) describes as a “polycentric institution”, which is a
nested, semi-autonomous decision-making organization that simultaneously operates at
multiple scales, which helps to overcome the rigidity trap imposed by bureaucracies.
Because of this the organization has enhanced the capacity for ALM with both ALM
groups.
Human and cultural capital: reinforcers of social capital
Becker (1994) finds that human capital is the embodiment of knowledge, skills,
and abilities of people. He deduces the most important investments of human capital
come from education and training. Comparatively, cultural capital refers to knowledge
obtained by human societies that provides them with the means to adapt to and deal with
the natural environment, and also how to actively modify it (Berkes and Folke 1992).
Both ALM cases, as illustrated, have unique capabilities due to long-established networks
that have reinforced social capital. I argue that existing human and cultural capital are a
main catalyst for building social capital enabling ALM, as was demonstrated by both
cases.
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Human capital enabling “all-hands”.
Both ALM cases have built upon existing sources of human capital in their areas.
The Pacific Northwest region is known for its high level of ecological diversity and
richness in natural resources - this has drawn people with varied interests into forest
management. When the Northwest Forest Plan shifted forest management priorities to
include restoration, people engaged in this work were called upon. When the first
national fire policy, 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Management, urged a shift away from
pure suppression, more knowledge from professionals was needed. People in this region
have grappled with these forest management shifts and as a result built human capital to
better manage their forest resources, benefitting ALM efforts today. The newest shift to
resilience-based forest management again calls upon professionals to pave the way for a
new model with their skills.
As the Cohesive Strategy stresses a model like ALM, emphasizing actions to take
place on the landscape level, local partners must be able to organize, manage, direct, and
lead day-to-day planning and restoration work activities. Also, local partners engaged in
ALM are tied into a national network of forest professionals and officials and must
simultaneously engage on regional and national levels. To do this, I found a requirement
for bottom-up resource management is to have a high level of human capital, with an
emphasis on local managers’ skills and abilities (Gruber 2010; Lurie and Hibbard 2008).
Uniquely, both ALM groups comprise similar specialized sources of human
capital. Both groups have relied upon the work of PhD scientists that specialize in the
ecoregion that they are found. For example, AFR partners repeatedly cited Jerry Franklin
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(University of Washington), while the WKRP cited Carl Skinner (Pacific Southwest
Research Station).
Local network partners of each ALM group have been active in collaborative
forest management for over two decades. The Applegate Partnership’s founder led one of
the first attempts to bring together diametrically opposed parties, environmentalists and
the timber industry, to not only find common ground, but to collaborate. This regional
innovation has persisted. Similarly, the WRTC engaged in formal partnerships with the
USFS and laid the foundation for new contractual arrangements with the agency (Abrams
et al. 2015).
A few examples illustrate human capital through innovations by AFR partners,
and provide a glimpse into their impact. In Ashland’s formal cooperative agreement with
the USFS, I found three important figures filling key roles. The head of Ashland’s
Forestry Division Dept., Ashland’s City Mayor, and the USFS-AFR manager. All three
of these figures shared a common skill of bringing various groups together and
facilitating communication. The Forestry Division Chief brought local partners together
during the early stages of AFR; the Mayor lobbied in D.C. and influenced agency
officials to support AFR; and the USFS-AFR manager facilitated agreement and
collaboration among AFR partners.
Key figures in the WKRP who brought diverse partners together and facilitated
communication included: TNC actors facilitating the OSP process; a MKWC director
able to translate locally-rooted values to higher level partners (national, federal); a Karuk
PhD and USFS PSW scientist (along with others) working to unite science with TEK;
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and the SRNF supervisor (area tribal member), who helped to unify Karuk priorities with
USFS priorities, and through effective communication garnered wider support (e.g. USFS
Region 5).
The Western Klamath and Southwest Oregon regions have been areas of
innovation and creativity in part because of attracting research and researchers. This
supports Gruber (2010), who found through analysis of 24 CBNRM cases that effective
communication of research results and a common technical understanding among all
partners is integral to successful efforts.
Cultural capital enabling “all-lands”.
The areas of these case studies have rich, existing knowledge bases provided by
local tribal societies who live on their ancestral lands. The cultural capital present in the
region of these case studies includes the combination of western science and TEK.
Combining both knowledges is thought to broaden creative management solutions, and
likely lead to better ecological outcomes. In agreement with this, researchers have found
integrating locally rooted knowledges and practices of bottom-up management leads to
greater success for restoration projects (Blaikie 2006; Kellert et al. 2000; Gruber 2010).
The incorporation of TEK has led innovative restoration strategies for a new model of
fire management which does not yet have a set protocol for the design of restoration
treatments.
Lomakatsi has contributed human capital through their co-founders who embody
unique skills in having prior careers engaging with both the forest industry and private,
family forest owners. In their work with private landowners, Lomakatsi has specialized in
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pioneering ecological forestry treatments sourced from area tribal experts fluent in fire
ecology principles (Lomakatsi 2005). The organization works to fulfill its mission to:
“restore ecosystems and the sustainability of communities, cultures, and economies”
(Lomakatsi 2005). Lomakatsi’s ability to coordinate resources, work alongside federal
partners, and employ ecological forestry, while building trust with landowners and the
community are partially why this group has been so successful.
Comparatively, the western Klamath region, co-led by the Karuk Tribe is poised
to engage in large-scale, prescribed fire restoration experimentation because of its rural,
backcountry setting. This approach has many challenges, one of which is smoke exposure
for which the group has sought solutions to (i.e. home filter distribution). The group is
positioned to demonstrate the idea of resiliency on a large scale, and to exhibit the
effectiveness that reintroducing fire to a landscape could have in comparison to pure fire
suppression. Similar to AFR, this group is combining western science with TEK in their
innovative approach to restoration.
Enabling Factors and Constraints of ALM
Institutions for ALM encouraged by The Nature Conservancy
A striking example of capacity enhancement by TNC is through the FLN. TNC
and the FLN exhibits Ostrom’s concept of polycentric institutions where they “can
address environmental problems at multiple scales better than centralized governance
structures” and encourage different responses to complex problems and foster innovation
by gathering together diverse individuals and organizations (Cumming et al. 2013,
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p.1144). As more non-federal partners engage with federal partners in a resilience model
of fire management through ALM, complicated networks of federal agencies, state
forestry agencies, and local (county, municipal, and volunteer) groups, are piecing
together how to function as a unit. These complicated networks of fire managers must
organize and coordinate and TNC is helping in that mission.
The United States FLN (US-FLN) is a national organization, but ties in local and
regional FLNs (collaboratives) into the national organization, or network. Up to twice per
year local leaders meet with regional partners to share and learn from partners’ successes
and mistakes, and peer reviews of restoration plans (TNC 2013). The US-FLN has been
found to build local expertise, thus sophistication, through: knowledge sharing, training,
addressing particular needs through topical workshops, and restoration implementation
(Butler and Goldstein 2010). These FLN tactics enhance social capital and capacity for
ALM groups and projects as they encourage social learning to adapt to emerging
information.
Cumming et al. (2013) and others find necessities of fostering resilient landscapes
are developing appropriate institutions that will act flexibly, proactively, and at
appropriate scales (Butler and Goldstein 2010). These authors cite development of these
institutions must grow and adapt through social learning. TNC and the FLN display these
authors’ findings in promoting resilient landscapes through development of fire
management institutions that adapt and change by facilitating information sharing. Both
ALM groups have fully engaged with the FLN. Before WKRP was a formal organization,
group members formed a local FLN collaborative - WK-FLN. Similarly, AFR
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stakeholders, apart from the ALM effort, participated in a regional FLN collaborative –
Northwest FLN. Therefore, both cases have enhanced their capacities by engaging in the
FLN’s social learning process.
TNC is restructuring fire management institutions through a multi-scalar approach
by linking local and regional collaboratives into a national network. This has facilitated
problem solving and collective agreement among fire managers to actualize Cohesive
Strategy principles to on-the-ground work. The organization helps link policy and
decision makers, and high level (regional and national) professionals, to local level fire
managers addressing high fire risk and events that put their communities and well-being
in jeopardy. By the FLN bringing together diverse stakeholders in a formal way, and
enhancing local level capacities, the organization has significantly elevated the potential
for ALM – which greatly depends on local fire management capacities.
In addition to TNC and the FLN bringing stakeholders together, they also help to
create group cohesiveness in partnerships thus enabling groups to function as a unit. One
TNC staff and TREX manager articulated this ability at one of WKRP’s TREX events:
“through the Western Klamath Restoration Partnership and TREX, we can help by
providing key examples of how cost savings can be realized, while achieving better
ecological results on the ground and protecting and enhancing cultural resources. The
ability for our staff to communicate and engage with stakeholders on all levels is
instrumental in facilitating this paradigm shift” (TNC 2017, p. 3). The mission of TNC to
facilitate all levels of fire managers to work together is combatting one of the biggest
challenges of ALM and the shift to a resilient forest management model.
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Challenges to diverse stakeholder collaboration in ALM
Major challenges to ALM included: distrust by local managers and their
constituents to partner with federal agencies due to past, negative dealings such as in the
case with the WKRP; lack of confidence by federal agencies to partner with local groups
due to deficient capacities also demonstrated by the WKRP before TREX (i.e. political
and institutional sophistication); and underdeveloped mechanisms to usher shareddecision making authority thus joint-administration of projects which ALM encourages,
contrasting with traditional, top-down, agency administration. These findings mirror
previous findings (e.g., Ferranto et al. 2013; Bergmann and Bliss 2004; Gruber 2010;
McCaffrey et al. 2015; Cumming et al. 2013; Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Kellert et al.
2000; Wagner and Fernandez-Gimenez 2008).
Shared decision-making processes is likely the biggest hurdle for ALM groups
conducting jointly-administered restoration plans. Joint administration effectively means
all partners have a seat at the decision-making table and are all considered to have
equivalent contributions in carrying out the collectively developed restoration plan
mission. Trust and confidence by all partners lie at the heart of realizing shared decisionmaking authority within a partnership and are more attainable with existing social capital
and well-established social networks (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Kellert et al. 2000;
Gruber 2010).
AFR partners’ approach to ALM began small (but did later expand), with a welldefined planning boundary and shared decision-making. Their methods align with
authors in having an increased chance of success because of that approach (Cox et al.
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2010; Gruber 2010; Blaikie 2006; Armitage 2005). However, this counters a main idea of
ALM which is to scale-up to large scales, the boundaries of projects. Contrary to ALM’s
large landscape approach, AFR started small but has expanded; this research contributes
to the idea of ALM found by (Spies et al. 2017) that it can both start small (and expand),
or start at a large scale (WKRP). The WKRP exhibits a large landscape as the group’s
planning extent is expansive and complex, with greater numbers of partners, which better
matches national fire managers’ aims to scale-up ALM. Large areas treated by restoration
have the potential to save millions of dollars in fire suppression. This economic impact, if
demonstrated, could incentivize ALM as a more cost-effective approach to fire
management. Already AFR is instructive to learn from, particularly in how it has more
than doubled its original footprint due to significant progress partners have made.
To engage in shared decision-making, agency members are tasked with
countering agency culture of sole decision-making authority and to reexamine their
entrenched, decision-making protocol because of the potential benefits. Incentives for
ALM to the USFS I found were: overwhelming costs of suppression management
crippling restoration programs thus incentivizing partnerships to reduce project costs;
ongoing decrease of agency workforce capacities since the de-emphasis on extractive
management encouraging partnerships to supplement the loss; and conflict halting agency
projects due to distrust of intentions by citizens and environmentalists which is largely
remedied with their inclusion and seat at the decision-making table. To overcome the
inherent challenges within the above incentives, the USFS must have partners they can
trust and have confidence in, particularly when outside parties will conduct high risk
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based projects on federal lands, that the agency is held legally liable for (e.g. prescribed
burns).
Challenges and problem solving of ALM by local stakeholders
As discussed, both the AFR and WKRP are part of long-time social networks
involved in building social capital through collaboration with diverse partners since the
early 1990s. This collaborative history has built capacity for ALM projects helping to
overcome some of the challenges stated in the previous section. For example, the City of
Ashland has partnered long-term with the RRSNF since their 1929 joint cooperative
agreement. This agreement and collaborative environment have enabled the conditions
for stakeholders to engage in shared decision-making.
The cooperative agreement has been critical for formalizing joint management of
the City’s watershed, but the long collaborative history, and steadfast interest the public
has had in forest management has elevated local managers’ capacity to be an influential
partner. The relationship between the USFS and the City has fostered trust and
confidence among both parties to work with one another; enhanced local capabilities to
engage with federal partners; garnered political recognition with the City for their work
with the agency; grown public support for projects with the USFS through City outreach
efforts and partnerships with trusted organizations such as TNC and Lomakatsi (public
survey1); and built local workforce capacities by broadening partnerships.

1

Shibley, Mark A., and Michael Schultz. 2012. “Public Perceptions of AFR and Forest
Restoration; ￼Results from an Opinion Survey of Ashland Residents.” The Nature
Conservancy.
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Through AFR joint planning and completed restoration work on-the-ground, I
found significant support for project efforts which resulted in project expansion and a
broadened view of the landscape planning area. The AFR expansion project AFAR
incorporated private lands adjacent to AFR, and did so because of AFR’s success in
completing work which attracted funding from the ODF and NRCS. Accomplishing joint
planning and work on-the-ground is a complicated, long-term investment by many
partners. AFR partners met accomplishments by: having skilled partners (local and TNC)
at the table which garnered trust and confidence from the USFS; focusing efforts on
including the public throughout planning, implementation, and monitoring - fostering
support from the sector; and an organization like Lomakatsi, able to implement on-theground work. An important geographic distinction between AFR and WKRP is southwest
Oregon’s remaining intact forest industry infrastructure, which Lomakatsi can marshal
for restoration work. WKRP pilot projects (2017), whose partners don’t have access to
the same kind of infrastructure, will provide an important lesson on alternatives for ALM
project implementation as the group develops strategies to complete work.
The WKRP is addressing broad fire management issues similar to the AFR, but
also problem-solving issues specific to the western Klamath region. Particular incentives
for ALM in the region were: overwhelming costs of suppression management
incentivizing partnerships to identify locally relevant solutions; limited agency workforce

http://www.ashland.or.us/Files/Public%20Perceptions%20of%20AFR%20Forest%20Res
toration.pdf.
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capacities and desire of WKRP partners to ramp-up local restoration workforces; and
overcoming conflict halting agency projects due to distrust by area residents, particularly
on the KNF (versus the SRNF, which had more devolved decision-making processes).
In ten fire seasons between 2000-2015 over $450 million was spent on fire
suppression in the western Klamath mountains (Harling 2015). Simultaneously, local
managers have invested in developing alternative strategies to suppression (in partnership
with TNC), that saves costs while adhering to Cohesive Strategy principles. The group
has displayed Lurie and Hibbard’s (2008) finding that as geographic scales of bottom-up
resource management increase, there is a greater need to expand networking capacity (i.e.
utilization of partnerships for social capital gains). An example of this is WKRP’s work
with the TREX program – in addition to demonstrating cost savings it has connected the
group to national training programs. Interviewees spoke about recruiting trainees from
across the country to gain skills and to conduct work in the region - drawing in resources
from outside the area while ramping up restoration training nationwide.
WKRP’s restoration plan exhibits the utility of expanding its networking capacity.
Guided by Cohesive Strategy principles, the Orleans-Somes Bar CWPP, and WK-FLN
(among others), the restoration plan outlines alternative strategies for the reintroduction
of beneficial fire, prioritization of cultural resources, containment of wildland fire
(managed wildfire), and protection of residential areas and firefighter safety (Harling and
Tripp 2014). The group is taking a locally-relevant approach on a large scale, while
TREX is helping demonstrate cost savings of applying a resilience based approach to fire
management as well as building workforce capacities.
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Long-term, management cost savings projected by the WKRP partly involve
capacity development of local fire restoration crews, expanding restoration work in the
area - already a major economic driver, and scaling-up projects to meet landscape needs.
Significantly assisting these is the SRNF, an ardent supporter instilling trust and
confidence in the partnership by engaging in shared decision-making. SRNF contributed
funds to meet partners’ planning needs leading up to pilot projects – a dramatic shift in
traditional agency culture. Regional and national support from the SRNF and TNC have
aided long-term planning as well as gathered support from other entities such as with the
USFS Region 5 and NRCS, but the group is still in the preliminary stages of ALM.
A significant challenge facing the WKRP is upcoming pilot project
implementation because of the implications it may have for shared decision-making with
the KNF. To reiterate, the KNF contains two of three WKRP community-based project
areas, but has proven to be more reticent in its willingness to include local partners in
decision-making.
Interviewees spoke about the reluctance of the KNF to prioritize a partnership
with the WKRP. Obtaining trust and confidence between these entities has been
challenging. Reasons, in part, include the forest’s prioritization of commercial logging,
constituents in support of extractive management, and agency culture locked in Butler
and Goldstein’s (2010) “rigidity trap” - resistant to going outside standard protocol.
Lessons provided by challenges to ALM
Existing social capital among both ALM groups have enabled partners to meet
common challenges of a new fire management model rooted in local level capacities,
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involving: meeting costs of restoration management; shoring up lacking agency
workforce capacities; and, building public support to avoid conflict and legal actions
through education, landowner programs, and local participation in planning. Landowner
programs that provide funding and education, build public support, and formally include
these stakeholders in ALM. Public support, largely built by local stakeholders and
managers, is critical for recruiting landowners. It also helps to meet another significant
challenge - fostering receptivity to smoke-producing prescribed fire treatments. I found
that trust is at the heart of ALM. If local managers do not gain trust from their multiscalar partners, they will not likely foster public support either. Without public support,
as shown historically, conflict is likely and uncooperative relationships are the predicted
outcome (Bergmann and Bliss 2004; Gruber 2010; Kellert et al. 2000).
Persistent challenges facing both ALM groups and likely other similar efforts,
include limited workforce capacities; public exposure and resistance to smoke-producing
restoration treatments; and, attainment of stable funding whether through investment
and/or economic generation of restoration by-product utilization. Additionally,
interviewees conveyed an overreliance and unsustainable demand on local groups and
workforces to shore up lacking capacities within the USFS agency.
Both ALM groups are facing the challenges listed above and continuously
seeking solutions to them. Lomakatsi members emphasized the need for adjusting shortterm grant funding, that supports year-round local workforces, compared to part time
seasonal work. Seasonal work involves high turnover, frequent training, and
unsustainable demands placed on organizations like Lomakatsi and MKWC responsible
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for workforce management. Regarding smoke production, both the WKRP and AFR
partners have brainstormed solutions involving distributing home filters, as well as
planned and widespread notification to residents of upcoming project actions. As a result,
public receptivity to smoke related issues has largely been positive – given the presence
of public support and trusted relationships.
Funding challenges are a particularly complicated and challenging issue. I
observed partners’ problem solving in a variety of ways. A consistent approach was an
“above-all” strategy considering and evaluating all ideas. Interviewees noted that with
group progress while being tied into a national network through national partners, policy
and decision-makers were more likely influenced to invest in ALM. As illustrated,
incentives for restoration include a USFS agency in a budgetary crisis due to the
increasing costs, occurrences, and risk of severe wildland fire. These factors are
incentivizing federal and national fire managers, and policy and decision-makers to seek
out innovative solutions that not only address crippling suppression costs, but counteract
this compounding problem plaguing U.S. national forests.
Sustaining ALM by Formalizing Communication and Coordination
ALM, as encouraged by the Cohesive Strategy, is a paradigm shift from an old
model to a new model in the institution of fire management. As illustrated, I’ve equated
ALM to the all-lands, all-hands approach that the Cohesive Strategy suggests and that
support a resilience model. By the institution of fire management, I mean the
governmental and non-governmental organizations that fire managers work from, but
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also the rules and procedures they follow. By engaging in ALM, like the groups in this
study, these organizations are addressing modern management crises and aiding the
paradigm shift that is restructuring the institution of fire management. Instead of
suppression that both excludes fire and local stakeholders from fire management – which
has been detrimental, the resilience approach unites fire and local managers so that
mutual benefits can result.
Simply put by interviewees - a resilience model is a proactive (or preparatory)
mode rather than a reactive mode of fire management. However, making this shift means
breaking free from Butler and Goldstein’s (2010) “rigidity trap”, which has exacerbated
and reinforced an entrenched, dominant suppression model. This study demonstrates
through the ALM groups it is based, that there are case examples breaking free from this
rigidity by efforts to restructure fire management into a jointly-administered approach
rather than an agency-administered one. Previously, I stated ALM is differentiated from
CBNRM through formal partnerships that include local, regional, and national partners –
exemplifying joint-administration. I found a key component for engaging in jointadministration was a formal mechanism that allows groups to communicate and
coordinate.
An extensive study by Yaffee (1996) reviewed 77 partnership efforts consisting of
diverse stakeholders (local to national) engaged in ecological management. The author
found the most common insights from participants were the need for better organizational
and decision-making processes, and doing so through improved communication and
coordination. A necessity for this was creation of new decision-making structures.
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Because fire knows no boundaries, and its management is cross-jurisdictional by nature,
as well as fire management being a subject of national concern – programs and policies
have encouraged development of formalized mechanisms for all stakeholders to engage
in. The need for joint-administration of fire management is clear and policy is supporting
it, however it is up to local stakeholders to marshal capacities to engage in it.
I found that two primary components must exist to engage in joint-administration
of fire management. A willingness and support of the USFS to engage as an equal partner
in a partnership, and local level capacities so these different entities can effectively
partner and simultaneously build trust and confidence in one another. As illustrated, TNC
played a role in bringing these willing partners together and facilitating collaboration and
agreement, although quite different in both cases.
The Fire Learning Network, that WKRP worked directly with, is not only
enabling joint-administration by facilitating the OSP, but is working on a broader,
national level to assist in the restructuring of the fire management institution. In
comparison, AFR partners have uniquely, and over a long-time period, engaged in joint
administration through the decades old cooperative agreement with the USFS, but also
through a CWPP that largely drew the parameters of AFR’s plan. Additionally, AFR
partners’ engagement in a Master Stewardship Agreement which contractually binds
partners as well as being a cost share agreement enabled joint administration. Both the
WKRP and AFR offer frameworks for other ALM efforts and do so by displaying
alternative methods.

103
Cumming et al. (2013) finds that accomplishing landscape resilience requires
flexible institutions that incorporate social learning processes that can adapt and change
with findings and innovation – effectively breaking free from the rigidity trap. The ALM
groups in this study are exemplifying more flexible institutions by integrating local
stakeholder concerns and problem-solving mechanisms, but are also doing so by adhering
to Ostrom’s polycentric concept. Both groups are engaging in social learning through:
US-FLN annual meetings, the OSP’s prioritization of monitoring / learning / integration,
and TNC’s multi-party monitoring program (AFR program involving local forest
professionals). These social learning processes provide space for adaptation and
integration of new ideas which reinforces social capital and further builds capacities of
the groups. These mechanisms are dismantling the rigid structures that reinforce the
troubled suppression model, and are contributing to the renewed vision of forest
management being defined equally by both local and national managers.
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CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSION

This study sought to answer the research question: How is ALM implemented in
fire-adapted landscapes? To answer this I focused on two main aspects of these projects:
planning and implementation. Because ALM is a method of management without any
blueprint and reliant upon creativity and innovation of project partners, each case,
although they shared similarities, offered different lessons. In the introduction of this
thesis my stated hypothesis was that: for large-scale, cross-boundary coordination to
endure there must be institutions, programs, and policies to support them. In addition to
these three aspects, I linked other researchers’ analyses on institutional factors that
contribute to accomplishing resilient landscapes. Although each case offered different
lessons for ALM planning and implementation, they both shared the need for a
supporting framework (i.e. institutions, programs, policies) and resulting infrastructure
for carrying out this new management approach.
I mainly focused on the social, human, cultural, and financial capital present in
both ALM groups, and the interaction of these among their institutions, programs, and
policies they are situated. My findings describe how both the AFR and WKRP groups,
who each had various forms of capital, marshalled them to expand the infrastructure for
ALM.
This comparative case study discussed different groups engaging in ALM offering
different lessons for instituting a forest resilience model. The AFR – a small, four-partner
collaborative working on a relatively small planning area, and in a semi-urban
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environment, with a somewhat intact forest industry workforce was compared to the
WKRP. The WKRP – a larger collaborative working on a large planning area, in a
remote environment, without the robust workforce desired by managers faced different
barriers. Both groups devised creative ways to problem solve around challenges to ALM,
whether it was a small landscape-scale or the need to expand a workforce. By working to
solve these barriers, both groups aimed to attain similar goals – to expand implementation
of ALM in order to increase the pace and scale of restoration. This singular goal is shared
by fire managers nationwide. These groups are addressing this and providing policy and
decision-makers with alternatives to suppression.
Not surprisingly, funding is a main barrier to the expense of ALM, however it is
also incentivizing it. Support for instituting ALM as an alternative is great since costs of
wildland fire management are only projected to increase while funding for other vital
programs decrease. This reality is driving alternatives to fire management that decrease
costs while maximizing benefits. The AFR and WKRP are exhibiting these alternatives
and are at the forefront of the paradigm shift out of suppression management. Both
groups dealt with funding challenges differently. AFR’s expansion to AFAR occurred
because of partners’ ability to attain various and significant sums of funding while the
WKRP, through TREX, showed the cost savings of managing with prescribed fire
compared to suppression.
Lastly, the biggest challenge to instituting ALM is likely the reshaping of national
forest management which supports it as an approach to wildfire management, rather than
its current focus on suppression. Upending the status quo of suppression management to
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prioritize ALM instead, will redefine the institution of fire management. Interestingly, the
regions that are home to the WKRP and AFR have been at the forefront of innovative
changes in forest management for decades. Perhaps, it is not so surprising these places
are where solutions to new fire management practices are being found.
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APPENDIX 1. Interviewees from the Western Klamath Restoration Partnership:
collaborators and associates
Interviewee affiliation
Associated number (#)
Local NGO member
1
Klamath Mountains resident
2
Karuk tribal member
3
The Nature Conservancy representative 4
Environmental organization
5
representative
Forest Service agency member
6
Local NGO member
7
Local NGO member
8
Forest Service agency member
9
Karuk tribal member
10
Karuk tribal member
11
Forest Service agency member
12
Retired Forest Service person
13
Karuk tribal member
14
Local NGO member
15
Forest Service agency member
16
Forest Service agency member
17
Klamath Mountains resident
18
Klamath Mountains resident
19
Klamath Mountains resident
20
Klamath Mountains resident
21
Local NGO member
22
Klamath Mountains resident
23
Klamath Mountains resident
24
The Nature Conservancy representative 25
Local NGO member
26
Natural Resource Conservation agency
27
member
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APPENDIX 2. Interviewees from the Ashland Forest Resiliency Stewardship Project:
collaborators and associates
Interviewees’ affiliation
The Nature Conservancy representative
Retired industry and agency member
Natural Resource Conservation agency
member
Local NGO member
Forest Service agency member
Environmental organization
representative
Retired agency member
Applegate resident
Non-profit organization member
Oregon State University
Applegate resident
Retired agency member
BLM agency member
Applegate resident
Forest Service agency member
Retired agency member
Ashland City employee
The Nature Conservancy representative
Applegate resident
Applegate resident
Local NGO member
Logging industry representative
Local NGO member
Local NGO member
Retired agency member
Applegate resident
Logging industry representative
Logging industry representative
Oregon Dept. of Forestry agency
member
Applegate resident

Associated number (#)
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
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APPENDIX 3. Interview question template for stakeholder participants
STAKEHOLDER-SPECIFIC
For private/tribal landowners
1. Let’s start with some background
a. How long have you owned this land?
b. Do you live here on the property? Year round?
c. Are you from around here? (if no: when did you move here?)
d. How big is your parcel?
e. What percentage of your parcel would you estimate is forested?
f. Who owns the land that borders your property? (need categories)
2. I’d like to ask you questions about how you manage your land
a. What are your particular land management goals? (e.g. wildlife, recreation,
timber production, ranching, etc.)
b. How do you achieve these goals?
c. Have you received any assistance in reaching these goals?
i. grants, cost-share programs, other financial assistance
ii. technical support from natural resource professionals, agencies,
NGOs
iii. other?
3. I am particularly interested in fire and fuels reduction management.
a. On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being “not at all concerned” to 5 being
“extremely concerned,” how concerned are you about wildfire risk on your
land?
b. How concerned are you that conditions on nearby forestlands or properties
are contributing to these risks? Please explain.
c. How do you manage to address the risk of wildland fire and hazardous
fuels, if at all?
d. What has been effective in terms of fuels treatments to reduce fire risk?
e. What constraints have you encountered in terms of fuels treatments?
f. What would help you to achieve your fuels treatment objectives?
4. Do you work with neighboring landowners to achieve your wildfire risk
reduction goals? Do you:
i. jointly discuss treatments?
ii. jointly plan treatments?
iii. jointly pay for treatments?
iv. jointly implement treatments?
5. Do you think about management of your property within the larger landscape?
For agency members
1. Let’s start with your background – what is your job?
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2. What is your role in this project?
3. What do you do regarding wildland fire/fuels reduction work?
i. Direct treatments on the land? (mechanical, prescribed fire, use
of wildland fire, suppression)
ii. Working with landowners/outreach? (e.g. technical, financial
assistance)
a. How do you reach out to landowners? (if you do?)
b. Are there particular landowners that are harder to work with?
c. What landowner incentive programs are available through your agency?
4. What other agencies and groups do you work with on fuels reduction?
a. How is their approach similar/different to yours?
PROJECT PARTICIPATION (All interviewees participating)
History of the project
I understand that you are currently participating in Project X. I’d like to learn
more about your role in this project, your experience with it, and how it has
worked.
1. When did you first get involved with the project?
2. Why did you get involved?
3. What were your previous experiences with similar projects? What did you learn
from them?
4. What are the objectives of the group?
5. What kinds of fuels reduction or forest management activities has the project
undertaken? Does it plan to undertake?
6. Could you list the ongoing treatments you are familiar with?
7. How many acres have been treated (approximately) or are planned for
treatment?
Membership
1. Who is involved in the group?
2. Who is not involved in the project?
a. Who should be involved?
b. Why do you think they are not involved?
c. Have you reached out to landowners who are not involved? What do you
think could work to get others involved?
3. What were the specific things about this project that have helped you to
participate, and that encouraged you to do so? (social, economic, policy,
institutional)
4.
Were there any specific constraints that you had to overcome in order to
participate, or that have kept you from participating more fully? (social,
economic, policy, institutional)
a. How would you recommend overcoming these constraints in the future?
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5. Do you have any comments on what it has been like to work with other
landowners in this project (private, federal, state, tribal),
a. What makes it especially easy or challenging to collaborate with them and
coordinate wildfire risk reduction activities with them?
b. Are there landowner types (public, private, tribal) that you are more
interested in/willing to cooperate with than others? Why?
Funding
1. Where is funding for the project coming from? (varies by ownership)
a. For meetings, planning
b. For implementation of projects
2. Where could other funding come from in the future?
Benefits to landowners of participating in project (ask to all landowners)
1. What activities/treatments have you undertaken as part of this project?
2. How many acres would you estimate you’ve treated/plan to treat?
3. What treatment methods have you used? (e.g., prescribed fire, thinning,
mastication, create fuel breaks, etc.)
3a. What treatment methods are you unable/unwilling to use, and why?
3b. Did any of these treatments cross ownership boundaries, or were they
coordinated with treatments on neighboring properties? Explain.
4. Do you feel that this project is helping you to achieve your land management
goals?
5. What has the project helped you to achieve that you wouldn’t have achieved
otherwise (without participating in the project) in terms of accomplishing your
fire management objectives?
6. What are the benefits of working together (why do you do it)?
7. What are the disadvantages or the costs of working together?
8. What have been the costs/drawbacks to you of participating in this project?
9. Do you think the project will be effective in reducing the risk of fire to your
property? Why or why not?
10. Have you been involved in projects in the past where you tried to coordinate
with other landowners? What did you learn from that – barriers and what
facilitated success? (or: why did previous projects succeed or fail?)
Implementation of projects (ask to all partners)
1. What are the different legal or regulatory requirements that affect the
participation of different landowners? (e.g. NEPA, State laws, etc.)
2. What policies or programs have helped or hindered project implementation?
3. What would help you to implement this project more easily and to accomplish
more/more effective fuels treatments on the ground?
4. Who is hired to work on the projects? (e.g. contractors, technical experts)
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Landowner participation (ask to all partners)
1. What incentives do you see helping landowners to participate?
2. What disincentives do you see hindering landowner participation?
Relationships among project members (ask to all partners)
1. How do you work with other project members (federal, state, other public;
private corporate, private non-corporate, tribal)
2. How do resources (financial, technical) move or get shared between you and
other project members?
3. In what ways have you observed different landowners coordinate land
management activities among each other? Do they:
i. jointly discuss treatments?
ii. jointly plan treatments?
iii. jointly pay for treatments?
iv. jointly implement treatments?
COORDINATION AMONG PROJECTS
1. What are other groups and projects that you coordinate with? (e.g. Fire Safe
Councils, Watershed Councils, Resource Advisory Committee)
2. How do these groups work together or learn from each other? (e.g. for
planning, implementation, funding)
3. Are there similar people participating in the different projects/groups?
COMMUNITY CAPACITY/RESTORATION ECONOMY
4. Can you tell me about who conducts the implementation work for this project
on your lands/on the different ownerships?
5. Could you tell me about the capacity of the workforce around here to work on
these fuel reduction treatments?
6. Are there jobs being created? What kinds of jobs?
7. Who are you selling wood products to? (e.g. mills, biomass facilities)
8. What is the role of this project in helping to maintain or create new forest
products industry infrastructure or business capacity in this area?
9. Is there general community/social support for the project?
PROJECT PARTICIPATION: INTERVIEWEE NOT PARTICIPATING
1. I understand you are not currently involved in Project X
a. May I ask why not?
b. Are there specific constraints that have kept you from getting involved?
c. What would encourage you to participate?
ALL LANDS MANAGEMENT
1. I am particularly interested in forest management that is conducted at large,
landscape scales, which often involves working across land ownership
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2.
3.
4.
5.

boundaries. This has been termed “All Lands Management” or the “All Lands
Approach.”
Does the term “All Lands Management” mean anything to you? If so, what?
Does this large, landscape approach address some of the challenges you see
with wildfire?
Do you see policies or programs supporting All Lands Management?
What kinds of policies or programs or changes would you like to see, if any, to
encourage All Lands Management?

WRAP UP
1. What is the current life span of this project and where do you think it is headed in
the future? Where will it lead?
2. Do you think that as a result of this project experience you are likely to pursue
an “all lands”/or cross-ownership boundary approach to managing fire, other
environmental threats, or natural resources in the future? Why or why not?
3. Any final comments?
Do you have any project documentation that you can share or refer me to? (e.g., NEPA
documents, website, flyers they’ve developed, etc.)
4. Do you have any project documentation that you can share or refer me to?
(e.g., NEPA documents, website, maps, materials they’ve developed, etc)
5. Questions for me?
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APPENDIX 4. Code list created from content provided by interviewees. List does not
contain sub-codes but can be provided with interest.
Collaborative management codes
ALM favorable
ALM unfavorable
1. aspects of success collaboration
2. capacity building
3. collaboration among partners
4. governing strategy
5. collaboration experience
6. high level collaboration
7. incentivized collaboration
8. interagency collaboration
9. investment in collaboration
10. overcoming collaboration
challenges
11. strategic collaboration
15. fire restoration outcomes
16. restoration meanings
17. restoration strategy
18. scaling up
19. strategies land treatments
20. TEK
23. alternative economics
24. economic factors
25. economic feasibility
26. economic strategies
27. funding mechanisms
28. funding strategies
29. funding collaboration
30. local economy

12. collaboration fundamental changes
13. disincentives to collaborate
14. time constraints

Ecological codes
21. ecological constraints
22. high risks

Economic codes
31. economic constraints

Land management codes
32. alternative management
47. alternative management challenges
mechanisms
33. assess partner opportunities
48. implementation concerns
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34. communications
35. creative management approaches
36. creative problem solving
37. effective programs
38. implementation strategies
39. importance of partnering
40. innovation/alternative perspectives
41. innovative thinking
42. interagency coordination
43. lessons learned – past
44. models alternative management
45. place-based planning
46. strategic planning
51. agency procedures
52. institutional change
53. institutional support
54. policy enabler
55. political realities

49. planning challenges
50. traditional management

Political codes
56. legal constraints
57. problematic policy

Private landowner codes
58. landowner partnerships
66. private landowner disincentives
59. partnering with private landowners
60. private land fire management
61. private landowner learning
62. private/independent management
63. private landowner assistance
64. private landowner incentives
65. strategies to gather landowners
Social relations codes
67. agreement
92. community disconnection
68. build relationships
93. community exclusion
69. build social license
94. community makeup
70. build trust
95. conflicting viewpoints
71. changing natures (of USFS)
96. disagreements
72. community connection
97. distrust
73. common values
98. lack of institutional support
74. common vision
75. community building
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76. community driven
77. community inclusion
78. community needs
79. gathering public support
80. information sharing
81. inclusion of stakeholders
82. learning
83. local capacity
84. local expertise
85. new fire paradigm
86. personal values
87. roles of leadership
88. socio-ecological thinking
89. trail blazer
90. training – education
91. tribal perspective

